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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 21 DECEAMER, 1967 NumBER 1
Federal Regulation of Independent Natural
Gas Producers-An Adventure in Pragmatism
Joe H. Foy*
In describing and evaluating area rate-making, Mr. Foy concentrates
on its historical context. His discussion shows how conventional utility
and railroad regulatory methods grew to fit the economic characteristics
of the regulated industries. He traces the fluctuating standards of the
federal "fair value" era and the modern "end-result" era, with emphasis
on the Hope case, and analyzes the use of typical or representative costs
in various types of group proceedings. Concluding that natural gas pro-
ducers occupy a unique factual position, he warns that the FPC must
continue to devise ingenious, pragmatic methodology, untrammelled by
conventional regulatory concepts, if its regulation is to avoid crippling
the industry and impairing the nation's future gas supplies.
The "first and last question as to the law is what is the fact."
-Holmes'
All price regulation is essentially unnatural in a capitalistic economy.
Natural gas field price regulation as developed by the Federal
Power Commission is decidedly unique, occupying a segregated niche
of its own within the general regulatory framework. Even before the
days of federal producer regulation, an eminent jurist advocated singu-
larly flexible ingenuity in the regulation of natural gas, observing that,
"in no other field of public service regulation is the controlling body
confronted with factors so baffling as in the natural gas industry, and
in none is continuous supervision and control required in so high a
degree."2 One should resist the temptation to approve virtually any
natural gas regulatory measure proposed by the Commission merely
because it is difficult to imagine a more suitable one. Nevertheless,
OMember, Texas and Tennessee Bars, and vice president and general counsel of
Houston Natural Gas Corporation, an intrastate transporter and distributor of natural
gas, with only minor subsidiary operations subject to federal jurisdiction. The views
expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the positions of the Houston
Natural Gas Corporation on any issues involved.
1. 8 GrxAT A M EcAN LAwYEms 126 (W. Lewis ed. 1909).
2. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 621 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
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perhaps no other branch of the law more strikingly illustrates the
tendency and the ability of legal principles to conform to peculiar
economic facts, industrial circumstances, and the demands of ad-
ministrative practicability.
With Opinion No. 468, Area Rate Proceeding for Permian Basin,
3
the first final order fixing area-wide field prices of independent pro-
ducers, and Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC,4 affirming in part but remanding
the order for additional evidence and findings, the Commission and
the Tenth Circuit have brought into focus vexatious problems that
have plagued the industry, the regulators and the courts for over
thirteen years. These decisions culminate a series of pragmatic ad-
justments of regulatory policy to fit the peculiar economic facts of
the industry, under expanding judicial mandates.
There is good reason to suspect that independent producer price
jurisdiction is court-made, rather than statutory, law. Certainly it
did not germinate from any seed in the legislative history of the
Natural Gas Act.5 However, in 1954 the Supreme Court held, in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin (Phillips I),6 that producer sales
to interstate pipelines were sales for resale in interstate commerce,
and that the vague exemption afforded producing and gathering opera-
tions by the Natural Gas Act did not apply, reasoning that production
ceases before the sales are made and the gas is delivered to the
pipelines. 7 Some have contended that the Court based its decision
more on its assumption of a practical need for regulation than on
customary principles of statutory construction.8 They contended that
the Act was not "well-designed,"9 in fact, not at all designed to supply
statutory standards for the administrative task;10 and that, having
thrust an unsolicited duty upon the Commission, the courts have been
3. 34 F.P.C. 159, rehearing denied, 34 F.P.C. 1068 (1965). There are companion
orders issuing certificates, 34 F.P.C. 418 (1965); ordering producers who were not
parties to show cause why the area ceilings should not apply to them, 34 F.P.C. 424
(1965), and denying rehearing in the certificate proceedings, 34 F.P.C. 1082 (1965).
4. 375 F.2d 6 (1oth Cir.), cert. granted, sub. nom. Continental Oil Co. v. FPC,
388 U.S. 906 (1967). No consumer, distributor or pipeline purchaser interest appealed
from the Commission's orders.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1964). See Flittie & Armour, The Natural Gas Experience-A
Study in Regulatory Aggression and Congressional Failure To Control the Legislative
Process, 19 Sw. L.J. 448, 469-71 (1965); Comment, Extension of Federal Regulation
of Natural Gas Production, 40 CoRNELL L.Q. 328 (1955); Comment, Natural Gas
Act Construed To Encompass Sale by Independent Producers, 1954 U. ILL. L.F. 509.
6. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
7. Id. at 677-79.
8. Comment, Extension of Federal Regulation of Natural Gas Production, 40
Comnr-x. L.Q. 328 (1955).
9. See Sunray DX Oil Co. v. FPC, 370 F.2d 181, 190 (1oth Cir. 1966).
10. Comment, Are "Conventional Methods" Necessary in Natural Gas Rate Regula-
tion?, 41 CoRNELL L.Q. 438, 456 (1956).
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subsequently honoring an implied commitment to read the statute
broadly enough to enable the Commission to achieve practical regula-
tory control."
In the wake of this historic decision, the Commission and the courts
may have achieved an ultimate in accommodating a statute to eco-
nomic and practical realities. Critics have found in the CATCO,
12
Texaco,'3 Hunt14 and Callery15 cases concepts which they could not
justify or approve on the basis of the Natural Gas Act. Now the
Permian Basin Order and the Skelly case offer additional opportunities
for the extension of administrative flexibility on pragmatic grounds.
During the first six years after Phillips I, the Commission floundered
in fruitless efforts to apply traditional regulatory standards to in-
dependent producer rates. By 1960, it was convinced that it had
neither the time nor the manpower to make any substantial reduc-
tion in its workload by traditional methods. Opinion No. 338,16 dis-
missing an investigation of the rates of Phillips Petroleum Company,
announced the Commission's abandonment of the attempt to regulate
independent producer rates on an individual basis and its intention
to initiate a series of area proceedings in which it would seek to
establish fair prices for all gas produced in each area. With the
tentative approval of its project by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin
v. FPC (Phillips II),'7 the Commission pursued to completion the
Permian Basin proceeding. Meanwhile, other proceedings have been
initiated in other areas.'
8
By interim orders in the Permian proceeding, the Commission pro-
hibited the introduction of evidence of the individual costs of each
11. See Flittie & Armour, supra note 5, at 492 n.200.
12. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959); cf. Scott,
Federal Certificate Regulation of Producer Gas Sales: Initial Rates and Related
Problems, 18 Sw. L.J. 570, 589-93 (1964); Searls, Decision of FPC in Phillips
Petroleum Company Case and Effect on Producers of Commission's Statement of
General Policy No. 61-1, As Amended, 12th OIL & GAs LNST. 1, 20, 21 (Sw. Legal
Fdn. 1961).
13. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); see Fitzgerald, Adoption of FPC
Price-Changing Rules Without Evidentiary Hearing; Statutory Collision, 18 Sw. L.J.
236 (1964).
14. FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964), noted in 7 S. TEx. L.J. 307 (1964).
15. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery, 382 U.S. 223 (1965); cf. Attwell,
Present Status of FPC Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 17th OIL & GAs INST. 1,
13-15 (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1966).
16. 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
17. 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
18. 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960) (Permian Basin); 25 F.P.C. 942 (1961) (South
Louisiana); 30 F.P.C. 1354 (1963) (Hugoton-Anadarko and Texas Gulf Coast). These
four proceedings involve about 75% of the gas flowing in interstate commerce. Area
Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin), 34 F.P.C. 159, 176 (1965). A fifth proceeding,
encompassing another 14%, was initiated on February 28, 1967. Area Rate Proceeding
(Other Southwest Area), 32 Fed. Reg. 3792 (1967).
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producer.' 9 It circulated questionnaires among the parties to develop
composite cost information, to which many of the producers made no
answers.20 Evidence of broad scope, covering a multitude of economic,
financial and technical topics, was introduced. There were 251 days
of hearings, in which the record grew to 30,839 pages; 337 main
exhibits with numerous supplemental exhibits were received in evi-
dence.
21
Opinion No. 46822 finally emerged on August 5, 1965. The Commis-
sion held that area pricing through group proceedings is lawful under
both the Constitution and the Natural Gas Act. It deemed average
contract price levels resulting from arm's-length bargaining to be
inappropriate as a standard for the area price; it rejected a proposal
that contract prices be undisturbed so long as the ratio between re-
serves and production is not excessive; and it held that composite
costs should be the foundation of its price determinations.
Adopting the examiner's finding that the industry had developed
the ability to drill "directionally" for gas z3 as distinguished from oil,
and finding January 1, 1961 as a date when that ability had been
developed, the Commission established ceiling prices for "new, gas-
well gas" (gas-well gas reserves committed to interstate commerce by
contract after January 1, 1961), and "flowing gas" (including both
old, gas-well gas and gas produced from oil wells). As a basis for the
new gas-well gas price, the Commission used national data to develop
a composite current cost of exploration and production; for flowing
gas, it used composite historical costs incurred in the Permian Basin.
The tabulation24 on the next page shows the construction of the two
prices in cents per thousand cubic feet (Mcf).
These costs were rounded to 16.5 cents per Mcf and 14.5 cents per
Mcf respectively to establish the area prices in Texas, including pro-
duction taxes. Since New Mexico production taxes vary by counties,
the ceiling prices were reduced by one cent per Mcf for New Mexico
production, with the stipulation that actual New Mexico taxes could
be added to them.
These ceiling prices apply to gas of pipeline pressure and quality.
They are to be reduced by the cost of bringing the gas up to the
standards prescribed in the order.25 Furthermore, new gas-well gas
19. 27 F.P.C. 943 (1962).
20. Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin), 34 F.P.C. 159, 213-14 (1965). Orders
promulgating the questionnaires are published in 26 F.P.C. 247, 514, 531 (1961) and
27 F.P.C. 20 (1962).
21. FPC Press Release No. 13964, Aug. 5, 1965.
22. Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin), 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965).
23. Id. at 185-89.
24. Id. at 189-220.
25. Id. at 221-25. These standards include the maximum amounts of carbon dioxide,




Well Gas Flowing Gas
Exploration and Development Costs
Dry Holes 1.42 1.42
Other Exploratory Costs 1.59 1.59
Adjustment for Exploration in
Excess of Production 1.11 1.11
Production Operating Expense 2.70 2.70
Net Liquid Credit (3.10) (3.10)
Regulatory Expense .14 .14
Depletion, Depreciation and Amor-
tization of Production Invest-
ment Costs
Successful Well Costs 2.88 2.42
Lease Acquisition Costs .76 .64
Cost of Other Production
Facilities .31 .26
Return on Production Investment
(at 12 Percent) 5.21 4.38
Return on Working Capital .35 .35
Subtotals 13.37 11.91
Royalty at 12-1/2 Percent 2.05 1.83
Production Taxes 1.01 .90
Totals 16.43 14.64
which has a heat content of less than 1000 Btu per Mcf is subject
to a proportionate price reduction, while new gas-well gas which has
a heat content of more than 1050 Btu per Mcf commands a pro-
portionate price increase.26 Since much of the gas is subject to sales
contracts at prices lower than the applicable ceilings, the Commission
also fixed a minimum price of 9 cents per Mcf, subject to quality and
pressure adjustments, thereby allowing the contracts to determine the
actual prices paid between the floor and the ceiling established in
the order. In addition, the Commission exempted small producers
from the quality adjustments and certain filing requirements; and it
imposed a moratorium forbidding all producers to file for increases
above the area ceilings before January 1, 1968.
On appeal in the Skelly case, the producers attacked both the
foundation and the structure of the Commission's order. In an
pressure at which it may be delivered. See also, on application for rehearing, Area
Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin), 34 F.P.C. 1068, 1071 (1965).
26. Area Rate Proceeding (Permian Basin), 34 F.P.C. 159, 223, 224 (1965).
27. Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967).
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exhaustive opinion,z7 the Court of Appeals sustained the basic area-
approach against constitutional and statutory arguments. Although
area-pricing necessarily implies that low cost producers may prosper
greatly, while others may suffer inadequate returns, administrative
feasibility justifies the diverse results. In sections 5 and 16 of the
Act, the court found authority for the moratorium on future rate
increase filings. Respectfully, the court declined to examine "the
turmoil of numbers" in the record underlying the Commission's find-
ings, confining its review to questions of law. It found the two-price
system to be within the legitimate discretion of the Commission.
However, the court deemed the Commission's findings inadequate
to permit effective review. It held that the Commission must find
the dollar amount of group revenues and equate those with group
costs. Because the overall effect of the quality deductions on revenues
had not been established in the record, additional evidence would be
necessary on that point. There are intimations in the opinion that the
court is unsatisfied concerning the gap between 1000 and 1050 BTU's
in the BTU adjustment; and that it would be better pleased if the
ceiling prices had been applied across the board, regardless of con-
tract limitations. But overall, the court conceived that its duty under
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.29 was to determine whether the end
result of the order was fair to the group under regulation. This task
it believed to be impossible on the basis of the Commission's finding
that the area prices would result in a "fair relationship" between the
aggregate prices to be paid by consumers and the aggregate costs
incurred by the producers. "Fair relationship," it said, is only part of
the end result standard; that standard is "not satisfied by a reliance on
unknowns."3 0 Hence, it remanded the case for additional evidence
and findings on the effect of the quality deductions, the amount of
group revenues, and the precise relationship between aggregate
revenues and aggregate costs.
Furthermore, although the Commission's order had provided a
saving clause, by which individual producers might exempt their
operations from the general order, the saving clause did not provide,
in the court's opinion, sufficiently precise and detailed guidelines to
be effective. Holding that it was not adequate merely to provide
that "confiscation" would be prevented, the court instructed the Com-
mission to prepare a saving clause containing guidelines that will
permit an aggrieved and conforming producer "to be heard promptly
and to have a stay of the general rate order until its claim for exemp-
28. Id. at 26.
29. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
30. Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6, 34 (10th Cir. 1967).
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tion is decided."3' 1 On motion for rehearing, the court also held that
the Commission may order refunds of rates previously collected under
bond only for those periods during which group revenues exceeded
group costs.
32
Skelly is now pending before the Supreme Court on certiorari.33
The final decision will involve intriguing and baffling questions of
regulatory law and procedure. The constitutionality and legality of
the group approach, the rights of individuals in such a proceeding,
the standards by which a group order is to be tested, and the role of
costs in regulating prices, all must be considered in a setting domi-
nated by the Supreme Court's prior decision in FPC v. Hope Natural
Gas Co.34 and other related cases.
The following discussion develops the factual and legal background
of natural gas producer regulation, with reference to the statutory
framework, the distinctive regulatory problems encountered in apply-
ing the Natural Gas Act to producers, and the policies which have
apparently shaped the decisions of the Supreme Court in certificate,
as well as rate cases. It attempts to show how the Court has answered
related questions in the regulation of public utilities, railroads and
other industries in the context of their own peculiar factual circum-
stances. Special attention is devoted to the Hope case, since both
producer and consumer interests have cited it as controlling in the
current Permian litigation. The final two sections draw certain con-
clusions with regard to the legal and practical future of area regula-
tion.
I. TBF, STATUTORY FRAmEWORx AND T=m FniNG PRoBLEM
Proceedings before the Commission arise principally under sections
4, 5 and 7 of the Natural Gas Act. 5 Basic to the Commission's rate
regulation is the declaration of section 4(a) that all rates and charges
must be "just and reasonable," and that any rate which is not just and
reasonable is unlawful.36 Under section 4(c) all rate schedules of every
natural gas company covering jurisdictional sales must be filed with
the Commission.37 Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, such
rates may not be changed, except after 30 days' notice to the Com-
31. Id. at 30.
32. Id. at 36. The court further held that refunds may only be ordered on an
"equitable" basis.
33. Continental Oil Co. v. FTC, 388 U.S. 906 (1967). A number of petitions are
involved. Some of the producers argue in support of the Tenth Circuit judgment;
some oppose both FPC order and appellate judgment. All consumer and distributor
interests, as well as the Commission, support the Commission's order and urge reversal
of the Skelly judgment.
34. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d & 717f (1964).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1964).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1964).
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mission and the public, which is accomplished by filing new sched-
ules.38 Upon the filing of a new schedule, the Commission may enter
upon a hearing and decision, and it may suspend the new schedule
for a period not to exceed five months from the date on which it
would otherwise go into effect. After this period the new rates may
go into effect, subject to the Commission's power to require a bond
and order a refund of the portion of the increased rates or charges
ultimately found to be unjustified. 39 Under section 5, the Commission
may at any time enter into a hearing to determine whether an existing
rate is unjust or unreasonable;40 however, in a section 5 proceeding,
the Commission may act only prospectively.4'
Each natural gas company is required by section 7 of the Act to
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing
its sales and the construction, extension, acquisition or operation of
its facilities.42 A hearing on each certificate application is required by
section 7(c) 43 to ascertain whether the applicant is able and willing
to perform and whether the proposal is required by present or
future public convenience and necessity.44  The Commission has
authority to attach to the grant of the certificate "such reasonable
terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may
require." A temporary certificate may issue pending determination
of the application for a permanent certificate.45 Once a certificate
has issued, and has been accepted by the applicant, neither the fa-
cilities nor the service rendered thereby may be abandoned without
the approval of the Commission.
46
Because of the number and diversity of independent producers,
and of their jurisdictional sales, tremendous difficulties have been en-
countered in the Commission's efforts to apply the Act to them. 47
Filing requirements under section 4 were simplified by an order per-
mitting the producers to file their gas sales contracts as rate sched-
ules.48 However, the contracts of independent producers have dis-
tinctive delivery, service and pricing provisions which have caused
novel regulatory problems.
39. 15U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1964).
39. 15U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1964).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1964).
41. See Atlantic Re. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 389 (1959).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1964).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1964).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1964). Compare Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC,
364 U.S. 137 (1960), with United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 385 U.S. 83 (1966).
47. Tarver, The Natural Gas Regulatory Problem-A Middle Way, ABA MINERAL
& NATURAL RsoucFs SECTION 15, 16 (1961); Note, FPC Regulation of Independent
Producers of Natural Gas, 75 HjIAv. L. REv. 549 (1962).
48. Order 242, 27 Fed. Reg. 1356 (1962); see 18 C.F.R. §§ 154.92, 154.93 (1967).
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In meeting their own requirements for certification, the pipelines
have usually had to show that they had acquired at least a twenty-
year gas supply.49 Therefore, the producer contracts generally pro-
vide terms of at least twenty years. To induce the execution of such
long-term contracts, the pipelines have agreed to various forms of
price escalation. Clauses increasing prices in proportion to increased
taxes and other expenses are one type; regular escalation by fixed
increments at stated intervals is another; and, in some instances, the
contracts require price redetermination, with or without a specified
pricing formula, after certain periods.50 So-called "favored nations"
clauses were designed to give the contracting producer the benefit of
any better price paid by its purchaser in the field or area,5' or of any
better price paid by any other purchaser in the field or area.52 "Spiral
escalation" clauses provide that when the pipeline obtains increases in
its resale rates, it must pay proportionately higher prices to the
producer. For several years, the Commission permitted the filing of
contracts containing these variegated escalation clauses because pro-
ceedings under section 4 would be necessary to place in effect any
price increases occasioned thereby.5
Pressure, quality and heat content are generally regulated by de-
tailed contract provisions. These often incorporate pricing adjust-
ments, particularly in relation to heat content, for which the price
goes up or down in proportion to variations above or below a speci-
fied level of Btu's per Mcf of gas, usually 1000.54 Take-or-pay clauses
regulate deliveries by providing that the purchaser must pay for gas,
whether or not taken during the contract year, up to certain minimum
average daily, monthly or annual quantities, designed to afford fairly
regular depletion of the contract reserves over their estimated life;
the purchaser generally has the right to "make up" deficient quantities
in a limited period of years by taking gas in excess of contract mini-
mums without additional payment, except where intervening escala-
tion has occurred.55 Many of these provisions have an obvious effect
on the pipeline's costs, and therefore upon the ultimate prices paid
by consumers.
49. Hearings on H.R. 4560 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1955); Atkinson, Federal Regulation of Natural
Gas-The Independent Producers' Status, 13 Sw. L.J. 425, 463-64 (1959); Note, FPC
Regulation of Independent Producers of Natural Gas, 75 HAIv. L. Rlv. 549, 550
(1962).
50. See Richardson, Producer Contracts for Sale of Natural Gas in Interstate
Commerce, 11th Or. & GAs IN sT. 201, 224-27 (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1960).
51. So-called "two-party" favored nations clause.
52. So-called "three-party" favored nations clause.
53. Tamborello, 14 F.P.C. 123 (1955).
54. See Trunkline Gas Co., 33 F.P.C. 122 (1965).
55. See Order No. 334, January 18, 1967.
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Phillips 156 suggested no distinctive methodology for producer rate
regulation; neither does the Natural Gas Act. Soon after the first
Phillips decision, the Commission invited producers to suggest pricing
techniques which it might use in regulation. The result was incon-
clusive.57 In a case involving gas produced by a pipeline utility, the
Commission had tentatively adopted the standard of a "fair field price,"
based upon average prices established by negotiation between sellers
and buyers.1 The standard encountered judicial disapproval in City
of Detroit v. FPC.9 While the court said that the "conventional rate
base method" is not the only one available to the Commission, "it is
essential in a case such as this that it be used as a basis of com-
parison.... Unless it is continued to be used at least as a point of
departure, the whole experience under the Act is discarded and no
anchor, as it were, is available by which to hold the terms 'just and
reasonable' to some recognizable meaning." 60 After the decision in
Phillips 1,61 producers attempted in a series of cases to justify price
increases by evidence of arm's-length bargaining, competitive market
conditions, and other generalized economic considerations, without
proof of their individual costs of service. A dutiful Commission dis-
missed a number of applications for want of sufficient evidence; but
on appeal, the cases were generally remanded for reconsideration upon
a proper showing of relevant costs.
62
By 1959, the Commission had not processed any producer rate case
to a final rate-making order upon any definitive standard. There
was utter confusion in the effort to prescribe pricing standards for
the industry.6 Demand for gas continued to multiply, and producers
continued to file contracts at increasing price levels. Although aware
of its conditioning powers under section 7, the Commission was yield-
56. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
57. Consideration of Principles and Methods, 14 F.P.C. 1128 (1955).
58. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 13 F.P.C. 53 (1954).
59. 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955). A former FPC General Counsel has described
the history of the case in Gatchell, Some Basic Factors and Trends in Public Utility
Regulation, 12th On. & GAS INst. 23, 47-50 (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1961).
60. 230 F.2d 810, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The Commission has pending before
it a proceeding to determine whether area price ceilings fxed for independent pro-
ducers should apply to gas produced by pipeline utilities. The pipelines are advocating
use of the area ceilings.
61. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
62. See, e.g., Forest Oil Corp. v. FPC, 263 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1959); Sears &
Herrmann Corp. v. FPC, 263 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1959); Bel Oil Corp. v. FPC, 2,55
F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958); Associated Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.
1958); Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1958); Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 255
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1958).
63. For detailed history of producer rate cases prior to 1960, see May, Preparation
for Gas Rate Hearing Before the Federal Power Commission, 11th OIL & GAs INST.
123 (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1960); McGee, Independent Producers-After Six Years of FPC,
ABA MINERAL & NATunAL REsourtcEs SECnON 219 (1960).
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ing to producer price stipulations in order to assure the dedication of
gas to the interstate service.64 The situation came before the Supreme
Court in the CATCO65 case, and the Court firmly issued marching
orders.
CATCO's rationale rested squarely on the purpose of the Natural
Gas Act to "underwrite" just and reasonable rates. "The Act was so
framed," Justice Clark said for the Court, "as to afford consumers a
complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive
rates and charges." Since an initial price is subject to reduction only
through section 5 proceedings, "the initial certificating of a proposal
under section 7 (c) of the Act as being required by the public con-
venience and necessity becomes crucial." Acknowledging that the
Act does not require a "just and reasonable rate" to be determined
in a section 7 proceeding, the Court nevertheless thought the "inordi-
nate delay" experienced in section 5 investigations "requires a most
careful scrutiny and responsible reaction to initial price proposals of
producers under section 7." Among the situations requiring or justify-
ing Commission action would be initial prices which were "out of
line," or prices which would "trigger" general price rises or increases
in the applicant's own rates because of "favored nations" clauses or
otherwise. "Section 7 procedures .. .thus act to hold the line await-
ing adjudication of a just and reasonable rate." (Emphasis supplied.)
The CATCO opinion reflected a growing impatience with the lead-
footed pace of the Commission, observing that although Phillips I
was decided in 1954, section 5 proceedings were still in the investi-
gative stage. The delay was apparently "interminable." "This long
delay, without the protection of refund, as is possible in a section 4
proceeding, would provide a windfall for the natural gas company
with a consequent squall to the consumers." Hence, the practical
situation required the Commission to shift the burden of price ad-
justments to the producer by carefully examining initial price pro-
posals and imposing such price conditions in certificates as would
keep initial prices in line.
No "in line" price standard is prescribed in the Natural Gas Act,
much less a procedure or formula for determining one. There is a
discernible policy, however, in the CATCO opinion and its progeny
to hasten the grasping of control over producer prices; a sense of
urgency has electrified the judicial oversight. A period followed CAT-
CO, during which the Commission, under close judicial supervision,
struggled with "in line" standards under section 7 while it was wallow-
ing in the "just and reasonable" bog of the section 4 and section 5
64. Scott, Federal Certificate Regulation of Producer Gas Sales: Initial Rates and
Related Problems, 18 Sw. L.J. 570, 576-88 (1964).
65. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
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cases. Judge John R. Brown's dissenting opinion in a 1961 Fifth
Circuit decision 6 graphically portrayed the Commission's plight.
Reliance on market prices involved the risk of reversal under the
"suspect price" doctrine;67 justification on the basis of individual pro-
ducer costs intensified an already ponderous administrative burden.
II. PRACTICAL EXPEDIENTS PENDING ESTABLISHMENT
OF PRICE CONTROL
Examining its general powers, the Commission began to attack its
problems at their source. It commenced an investigation of escalation
clauses, under which it was being inundated with section 4 filings for
increases. Acting under section 16 of the Natural Gas Act,68 which
authorizes it to make "such orders, rules and regulations as it may
find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act,"
it proscribed "favored nations,"6 9 and "spiral" 0 escalation clauses in
contracts executed after April 2, 1962, by prospectively limiting con-
tract escalation clauses to three narrow categories.7'
Producers felt this was a violation of the filing privileges of section
4; and that the Commission could make such a ruling only after ad-
versary hearings on individual contracts. On separate appeals, the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the producers;72 the Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed.7 3 However, the Supreme Court settled the question in favor
of the Commission on broad practical grounds:
It must be remembered that under the Act rate increases are initiated by
the natural gas company, the Commission having the burden by reason of
§4(c) of the Act to initiate a hearing on their legality with only a limited
power to suspend new rates .... Natural gas companies that seek to enter
66. United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 133, 138 (5th Cir. 1961). See
Foster, Certificate Regulation of Independent Producers-After Six Years of FPC, ABA
MnERAL & NATuRAL REsouRcEs SECnON 195, 203-16 (1960).
67. Morris, Recent Independent Producer Certificate Cases: 'The Suspect Price'
Rule, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 489 (1964).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 717(o) (1964).
69. See notes 51 & 52 supra and accompanying text.
70. See text accompanying notes 52 & 53 supra.
71. 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1967), defines the permissible types as follows:
"(a) Provisions that change a price in order to reimburse the seller for all or any
part of the changes in production, severance, or gathering taxes levied upon the
seller;
"(b) Provisions that change a price to a specific amount at a definite date; and
"(c) Provisions that, once in five-year contract periods during which there is no
provision for a change in price to a specific amount (paragraph (b) of this section),
change a price at a definite date by a price-redetermination based upon and not
higher than a producer rate or producer rates which are subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission, are not in issue in suspension or certificate proceedings and, are in
the area of the price in question ......
72. Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1963).
73. Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963).
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the field with prearranged escalator clauses and the like have a built-in
device for ready manipulation of rates upward. Protection of the consumers
against that device may be best achieved if it is done at the very thresh-
old of the enterprise....
To require the Commission to proceed only on a case-by-case base would
require it, so long as its policy outlawed indefinite price-changing pro-
visions, to repeat in hearing after hearing its conclusions that condemn all of
them.... We see no reason why under this statutory scheme the processes
of regulation need be so prolonged and so crippled.7 4
The anticipated practical effect was to diminish the number of
section 4 filings, since under the Mobile75 case a natural gas company
has no right to file a changed "schedule" which is contractually un-
authorized. However, section 4 proceedings would continue to in-
crease under contracts which had been executed prior to April 2,
1962. In order further to curtail section 4 filings, the Commission
essayed to condition a temporary certificate by requiring the ap-
plicant not to file for increases pending permanent certification.
Again the Supreme Court responded to producer challenge by sustain-
ing the Commission's authority.
76
Finally, the Commission consolidated its section 7 pricing powers
in the Gallery"7 case. It refused to admit in evidence "a tremendous
mass of cost-type, economic and financial evidence" tendered by the
producer on the "in line" price issue. Fixing an in-line price of 18.5
cents per Mcf, plus tax reimbursement, it prohibited the producer
from thereafter filing any increased rate schedule above 23.55 cents
per Mcf until a "just and reasonable" rate should have been estab-
lished for the area, or until July 1, 1967, whichever was earlier,
because any higher filing would "trigger" contract escalation clauses
of other producers. It further ordered the producer to refund all
amounts theretofore collected in excess of the in-line price, although
no refund condition had been imposed in the certificate under which
the sales had been initiated.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Commission on all points.
78
Price, it said, is "not the whole thing" in determining public con-
venience and necessity. Demand, potential supply, increases in the
costs of meeting the demand, all should be considered. It was error
to exclude evidence bearing on these factors. Furthermore, the mora-
torium exceeded the reasonable limits of administrative power. In
this case, nearly ten years had passed since the original certification,
almost half the contract period. To sustain the moratorium would
74. FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 42-44 (1964).
75. United Gas Pipe Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
76. FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
77. Callery Properties, Inc., 30 F.P.C. 283 (1963).
78. Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964).
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allow the Commission to obtain "an irrevocable dedication of the
gas to interstate sale and an effectual denial of any opportunity
for the producer to exercise the legislative right to file, subject
to suspension and refund, contractual rate increases. If the
Commission may do it for half of the period, there is no reason why
it may not do so for all."79 Granting that the power to require refunds
existed in these circumstances, they should be based, not on the
in-line price but on the just and reasonable rate to be established in
the pending and applicable area rate proceeding.
However, the Supreme Court held that the Commission had acted
'lawfully and responsibly" in line with the CATCO decision. 80 Experi-
ence had convinced the Commission that "the minimal utility derived
from cost and economic trend evidence was outweighed by the
administrative burdens and delays its consideration inevitably pro-
duced."81 The Court agreed with this practical conclusion. Moreover,
it found that the moratorium was within the conditioning powers of
section 7 and that the prohibitory price level reflected the Commis-
sion's expertise; and it approved the refund of all amounts in excess
of the in-line price.
Not all of the fallout of CATCO has been noted here-just enough
to indicate the power of the Supreme Court's urgent thrust toward
the initial establishment of regulatory control. In a case like Callery,
the Court was openly permitting the risk that a producer would be
trapped into exhausting the reserves under a given lease without ever
having an opportunity to be heard on costs and without a just and
reasonable rate ever having been established. Unless a sixth sense
enabled the highest Court to ascertain that the in-line price was
compensatory, the result can only be justified on the ground that
the public need overrode the private right to due process, procedural
as well as substantive. Although its record in the courts of appeal
was spotty, the Commission could claim a perfect batting average in
the supreme tribunal, so long as its orders were tending to bring
prices under control, forestall increases, and promote the payment of
refunds to consumers. Unless these decisions are to be regarded as
temporary expedients justified by a spiralling-price emergency, their
plain implication relegates common conceptions of fair play and due
process to dismal seats in a distant comer of the courtroom; but the
Court made no attempt to support its conclusions by precedents which
turned on the temporary character of the administrative action.82
79. Id. at 1017.
80. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223 (1965).
81. Id. at 228 n.3.
82. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921) ("A limit in time, to tide
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III. CONVENTIONAL COST METHODOLOGY DISCARDED
As a result of the remand in Phillips I, the Commission reinstituted
its section 5 investigation of the field prices of Phillips Petroleum
Company, consolidating in the proceeding a number of section 4
applications by Phillips for increased field prices. After approximately
six years, on September 28, 1960, the Commission rendered its decision
in this case, the first really definitive opinion to be issued in a con-
tested independent producer rate case.83 It found that Phillips' cost
of service exceeded its contract prices during 1954 and prior years,
and therefore dismissed the proceedings, even as to later years.
At the same time, the Commission declared its independence of
individual cost of service methodology in producer rate cases. Experi-
ence had convinced the Commission that "the traditional original cost,
prudent investment rate base method of regulating utilities is not a
sensible or even a workable method of fixing the rates of independent
producers of natural gas."84 Producers could not be treated like public
utilities. In contrast to the utility, which is reasonably assured of the
financial feasibility of a project before any funds are expended, "the
producer must invest his funds prior to ascertaining whether he will
have anything to sell or whether, if he does, he will have an adequate
market."a5
Furthermore, the individual cost of the producer is not related to
the amount of natural gas which it ultimately has to sell. The Com-
mission recalled a statement from the dissenting opinion of Justice
Jackson in the Hope case:
[T]he service one renders to society in the gas business is measured by
what he gets out of the ground, not by what be puts into it, and there is
little more relation between the investment and the result than in a game
of poker.
86
As a matter of fact, the Commission said, "under the cost rate base
method, the producer who first takes the risk in an area and proves
it productive will get the least return, for he will undoubtedly pay
less for his rights than those who came in later after the area is
proved."
8 7
Administratively, the individual cost of service method was com-
pletely impractical. Since much natural gas is produced along with
over a passing trouble, may well justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent
change").
83. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
84. Id. at 542.
85. Id. at 543.
86. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 649 (1944).
87. 24 F.P.C. 537, 543 (1960).
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oil, the cost method would require an allocation of the respective costs
of producing the oil and the gas. "A producer actually could become
bankrupt, or could make enormous profits, depending merely on the
methods of allocation used."8 In part, the development of unit costs
would necessarily be based upon estimates of reserves in place under-
ground, "which can never be precise and have been shown to be
highly inaccurate in many cases."89 For this reason, as well as the
practical impossibility of dividing costs between the unregulated com-
modity, oil, and the regulated commodity, gas, "the calculation of
the unit cost of gas is, and will be, an inexact, complex, unsatisfactory,
and time consuming process, fraught with controversy." 90
Furthermore, at that time the Commission had accumulated filings
by 3,372 independent producers, to whom should be added 15,435
non-filing co-owners under any rate base theory. At the date of the
decision, 11,091 rate schedules and 33,231 supplements were on file.
Awaiting hearings and decisions were 3,278 producer rate increase
filings, involving 570 of the producers. If the existing staff of the
Commission were tripled, it nevertheless thought that it could not
reach a current status in its independent producer rate work until
2043 A.D.91 Acknowledging the implications of City of Detroit v.
FPC,92 that in every case it must calculate a rate base and determine
a rate of return at least as a point of departure, the Commission drew
the issue plainly: if that decision prohibited its new approach, then
"adequate regulation of producers appears to be impossible under
existing law."9
3
Therefore, the Commission announced that it would attempt to find
"fair prices for gas, based on reasonable financial requirements of
the industry and not on the particular rate base and expense of each
natural gas company."94 It would consider the need for a price
adequate to maintain the gas supplies needed by the consumers of
the nation, would make use of cost data which it had obtained in the
past and would acquire in the future, and would use all information of
an economic nature acquired in the past and in the future. But the
Commission was aware that "costs incurred in the past are only a
part of the body of information pertaining to the economics of the
gas producing industry which is necessary for intelligent regulation of
that industry."95 However, it could foresee that "a representative
88. Id. at 544.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 545, 546.
92. 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955).





sampling of the industry in any one area must be accepted as part
of the basis for fixing rates for all producers in the area."
96
On the same day, the Commission promulgated Policy Statement
61-1, 97 delineating areas of the country in which it would later insti-
tute area-wide rate determinations, and specifying guideline rates
to be considered in certification proceedings pending the establishment
of just and reasonable area rates. No disclosure was made of either
the basis for the guideline rates or the effect which they would have
in future proceedings as either a ceiling or floor for initial prices.
In summary, the two orders presaged a complete departure from the
traditional method of rate regulation developed in pipeline cases by
the Commission.
Consumer interests took the case for review to the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.98 That court found ample justification
for the new departure, although it was inconsistent with the Court's
own decision in the City of Detroit9 case. Calling attention to "the
differences between a public utility, such as a pipeline rendering a
service by means of a fixed plant and operation, and a producer, who
discovers or buys a product where, when and under such terms as
he may, and sells that product under contracts negotiated on the
open market,": ' 00 the court could discern ample statutory authority
for innovation. The court distinguished the regulation of the rates at
which a public utility service is performed, and the regulation of the
prices at which a commodity, like natural gas, may be sold:
Almost the whole of the economics of merchandising differs from the
economics of public utility service. Are the just and reasonable prices of
[a natural gas merchandiser] limited to fair returns on his own investment
and prices paid by him (and, if so, what investment and what prices), or
are those prices reasonably measured by the fair prices for the product as
measured by the open competitive market for the product, evaluated by
Commission expertise and data on the whole of the market operation? Either
criterion is a method of regulation. It seems to us that the choice must lie
with the Commission.10 '
While the Commission had by no means indicated in its order that
it would confine itself in future cases to an examination of market
prices, the court seems to have felt that would be a permissible method
of regulation. As to the argument that the new method would present
insoluble constitutional problems of confiscation, the court said those
96. Id.
97. 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
98. Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
99. 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955).




questions would have to await "proof presented by a producer in
respect to a particular rate in a particular area."10 2
A bare majority of the Supreme Court affirmed the lower tribunals
in a cautiously worded opinion. 03 While the area price method was
not directly involved, the Court indicated its awareness that the de-
cision would at least imply its validity or invalidity."04 The majority
could find no reason to believe that the area pricing method would
be unworkable, illegal or unconstitutional. It found the opinion of the
court of appeals to be "thorough and informative," but placed no
reliance on that court's suggestion that cost data might be subordi-
nated to evidence of "fair prices for the product as measured by the
open, competitive market." To the contrary, the Court relied on the
assurance of the Commission that "composite cost of service data will
be considered in the area rate proceeding."1 5 It felt that "to whatever
extent the matter of costs may be a requisite element in rate regula-
tion, [there was] no indication that the area method will fall short
of statutory constitutional standards."10 6 With particular reference
to the Hope'0 7 case and its contemporaries,0 a the Court saw no
precedent which could properly limit the Commission in its choice
of regulatory method.
A vigorous dissenting opinion by Justice Clark, in which the Chief
Justice and Justices Black and Brennan concurred, described the area
rate experiment as a "new, untried, untested, inchoate program
which, in addition, is of doubtful legality."10 9 The dissenting Justices
thought that an area price would have to be a floor, rather than a
ceiling, and "to be constitutionally sound must include a showing that
the individual producer at the area rate fixed will recover his costs;
otherwise it would be confiscatory and illegal."" 0 They disagreed
sharply with the cost of service findings of the Commission, strongly
asserted a conviction that Phillips' prices were too high by applicable
standards, and would have required the Commission to reconsider its
102. Id. at 389.
103. Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
104. "If we believed that such a departure from present concepts had little, if any,
chance of being sustained, we would be bard pressed to say that the Commission had
not abused its discretion in terminating this § 5(a) proceeding while undertaking the
area experiment. For if area regulation were almost sure to fail, and if the individual
company cost-of-service method had been abandoned, then there would be virtually
no foreseeable prospect of effective regulation. Difficult as the problems of cost-of-
service regulation may be, they would not warrant a breakdown of the administrative
process." Id. at 308.
105. Id. at 310.
106. Id. at 309.
107. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
108. Colorado Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); FPC v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
109. Wisconsin v. FTC, 373 U.S. 294, 317 (1963).
110. Id. at 327.
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dismissal. Moreover, the dissenting Justices were unconvinced by the
Commission's protestations of administrative impossibility, feeling that
it could develop exemption regulations eliminating the great pre-
ponderance of the cases, and thus free itself to proceed on a cost
basis with those which remained."' At this point, the dialogue be-
tween the majority and the minority could be regarded by the Com-
mission as an assurance that the questions of constitutionality and
statutory authority, in the light of the Commission's findings of the
economic and practical characteristics of the industry and adminis-
trative feasibility, had been thoroughly debated within the Court, and
that the tentative step away from individual cost methodology had
a good chance of ultimate approval.
Nevertheless, the authority of Phillips II is murky, because the facts
did not require the Court to illuminate directly the issues of the
precise role of individual costs, necessary procedural safeguards and
indispensable findings."12 Consumers pressed the appeal, arguing that
the dismissal was wrong because it left them to the protection 6f
a method which could not work, since regulation must allow each
producer the recovery of his costs. Although that argument sounds
hollow coming from consumers, it remains to be seen how the majority
will respond to specific producer equities, and how the minority will
react when the confiscation argument, which impressed them so in
consumer briefs, is urged upon them by the victims of an allegedly
confiscatory order.
IV. DEVELOPMNT OF TE CONVENTIONAL STANDnDS:
TB-E FAIR VALUE RuLE
Since both producer and consumer interests have resorted to the
assertion of principles purportedly established in judicial review of
public utility and carrier rate regulation, it should be useful to examine
the historical background of price regulation as reflected in the
Supreme Court's decisions. Although the authorities in the public
utility and railroad fields are not directly applicable, some under-
standing of what those authorities teach is essential in order to avoid
mistaken analogies. Furthermore, the reflection of varying judicial
reconciliations between public and private interests, as well as be-
tween the legislative and judicial power, may shed some light -upon
the precise issues involved in the current litigation.
Rate making is, of course, an exercise of legislative, not judicial
power, whether the legislative branch acts directly through a statute,
or indirectly through delegation of authority to a commission or
111. Id. at 329.
112. Id. at 308.
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agency." 3 Perhaps the most difficult decision for the Court is to what
extent it may or must regulate the regulator, since the Court itself
has no power to fix rates. Some early decisions tended to leave
legislative rate-making excesses to correction solely at the polls;" 4
however, the Court evolved a standard of review requiring no less
than reasonableness, judicially ascertained, 5 as the level below which
it would enjoin the enforcement of a statute or order. Most of the
cases have involved the constitutionality of state regulation; conse-
quently the processes as well as the ultimate standards of review
have most often been shaped by judicial precedent rather than statu-
tory specifications. Furthermore, economic and factual analysis have
often influenced the Court more than pure legal theory; the Court
has long recognized that "the extent to which regulation may reason-
ably go varies with different kinds of business."" 6
Railroads and public utilities began to be regarded as potential
predators by the legislatures of the late nineteenth century. Entry
into the field is limited by the large capital investments which charac-
terize these businesses.117 The nature of the enterprises limits the
degree and effectiveness of competition, ordinarily the best protector
of the public against extortionate charges for necessary commodities
or services." 8 Price regulation originated as a substitute for the control
ordinarily expected from free competitive forces." 9 At the same time,
there has been early and consistent agreement that unlimited com-
petition is unnecessary and even undesirable in these fields. 120 Dupli-
113. "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand
on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose
and end. Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes existing
conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the
future, and therefore is an act legislative, not judicial, in kind. ... Prentis v, Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
114. Peik v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
13 (1877).
115. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). Compare Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), with St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936), particularly Mr. Justice Brandeis'
dissenting opinion in the former, 253 U.S. at 292, and his concurring opinion in the
latter, 298 U.S. at 73. See Comment, The Scope of Judicial Review of Rate Regulation,
39 ILL. L. REv. 160 (1944). An interesting sidelight in the Hope case is the dialogue
between Justices Black and Murphy, concurring, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting,
over whether "congressional acquiescence" in Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota
might "fairly be claimed." FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 619, 620, 625
(1944).
116. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 538-39 (1923).
117. P. GAR FIELD & W. LoVEJOY, PUBLIC UnLITY ECONOMICS 22-24 (1964).
118. Id. at 16-18.
119. Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of
Utilities in a Growth Economy, 74 YALE L. J. 989, 990 n.5 (1965).
120. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATEs 11 (1961); P. GARFIELD
& W. LOVEjoY, PUBLIC UnLrT ECONOMICS 16-18 (1964).
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cation of the large capital outlays typically involved is an economic
waste of resources. Therefore, through franchise and certificate
regulation, direct competition has been largely eliminated in tradi-
tional utility fields.' 12 Just as entry into the business is limited, the
abandonment of a facility or service is often prohibited or regulated
on public interest grounds. Hence, dedication of large and extensive
aggregations of facilities to public service subjects private property to
public use under governmental restriction and protection in a sense
which comes as close to public ownership as anything in the private
sector of the economy. Justice Brandeis reasoned of a fictional
bargain which the utility investor makes with the community:
The investor agrees, by embarldng capital in a utility, that its charges to
the public shall be reasonable. His company is the substitute for the State
in the performance of the public service; thus becoming a public servant. 122
These economic considerations led the Court to concentrate on the
extensive property interests of the investor in cases attacking state
regulation of rates. By analogy to principles involved in eminent
domain, the Court developed a concept of confiscation of the value
of the property wherever inadequate rates were imposed.'2 3 The
landmark case of Smyth v. Ames124 rejected a railroad's argument that
a regulatory statute was unconstitutional unless it permitted the com-
pany to earn a sufficient amount of revenues to cover its operating
expenses, the interest on its debt, and dividends for its stockholders.lm
To the contrary, it held that "what the company is entitled to ask
[as profit] is a fair return on the value of that which it employs for
the public convenience."126 On the other hand, it would be a wrong
to the public for the company to exact rates "without reference to the
121. P. GARFIELD & W. Lovajoy, PUBLIc UTInTY ECONOMIcS, 28-32 (1964).
122. Missouri ex tel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S-
276, 290-91 (1923) (concurring opinion).
123. "When the property itself is taken by the exertion of the power of eminent
domain, just compensation is its value at the time of taking. So, when by legislation.
prescribing rates or charges the use of the property is taken, just compensation
assured by these constitutional provisions is a reasonable rate of return upon the value."
West v. Chespeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 671 (1935); Reagan v. Farmer's.
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 410, 412 (1894); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minne-
sota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890); Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886).
124. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
125. Id. at 543-44.
126. Id. at 546-47. "And, in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of con-
struction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market
value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original cost of con-
struction, the probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates pre-
scribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters




fair value of the property used for the public, or the fair value of
the service rendered."-'
It followed that the returns constitutionally protected would fluc-
tuate with economic cycles. "It is well established," said the Court in
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., "that values of utility properties
fluctuate, and that owners must bear the decline and are entitled to
the increase."128 There were also other consequences. Where utility
management had made "mistakes of construction, even though
honest,"129 where plants were overbuilt, 13 where extended drouth
depressed values,131 where the management engaged in unsuccess-
ful speculation, 132 where facilities became obsolete,133 the investor
must bear the economic brunt. Actual interest and dividend require-
ments of the regulated company itself were not the judicial standard
employed for review: the Court said in Covington & L. Turnpike Co.
v. Sandford that "the public cannot properly be subject to unreason-
able rates in order simply that stockholders may earn dividends."
1 34
On the other hand the Court provided that value increases during
upswings of the economic cycle should inure to the benefit of the
investor:
[W]e are not limited to the consideration of the actual investment. If
that has been reckless or improvident, losses may be sustained which the
community does not underwrite. As the company may not be protected in
its actual investment, if the value of its property be plainly less, so the
making of a just return for the use of the property involves the recognition
of its fair value if it be more than its cost.135
Evaluation of the rate of return involved ultimately an analysis of
the position of the regulated enterprise in the economic structure.
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,136 for instance, noted the relative
safety of the gas utility's securities. Justice Butler articulated the
classic test of utility rate of return in the famous Bluefield Water
Works 37 case:
127. Id. at 544.
128. 272 U.S. 400, 410 (1926).
129. See, e.g., Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin Canal & Irrigation Co., 192 U.S.
201, 214 (1904).
130. Cf. Galveston Elec. Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 395 (1922)
(Brandeis, J.: "Past losses obviously do not tend to prove present values").
131. See, e.g., San Diego Land & Town Co. v. jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 444-45 (1903).
132. Id. at 447 (Holmes, J.: "If the original company embarked upon a great specu-
lation which has not turned out as expected, more modest valuations are a result to
which it must make up its mind"); cf. Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U.S. 680 (1888).
133. See, e.g., Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287
(1933).
134. 164 U.S. 578, 596 (1896). See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
135. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352,454 (1913).
136. 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
137. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
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A public utility is entitled to such rate as will permit it to earn a return on
the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public
equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same gen-
eral part of the country on other investments which are attended by cor-
responding risks and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits
such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or specula-
tive ventures.1-
Fairness to the utility investor, consistent with legitimate public
interest, reflected his practical expectations to a greater extent than
any a priori concept of entitlement. If the utility return were com-
parable to that which might be expected through the normal exercise
of economic forces, in the absence of regulation, it could not be
branded as unreasonable.
Lacking criteria adequate to measure directly the "fair value of
the service rendered,"139 or the amount which "the services were
reasonably worth,"'140 the Court had to concentrate on the effect
which the rates would inflict upon the individually regulated enter-
prise. This was a kind of "end-result" test in the pre-Hope days.
Often disregarding the method by which the rates had been devised,
the Court tested their results on each complaining company by its own
findings of rate of return on the fair value rate base.'4' The test was
fashioned to fit the most salient economic characteristics of the indus-
try. Thus, the focus on a fair value rate base resulted from the
industry's relatively large investment in property, plant and facilities;
and the standards of rate of return took into account the typically
protected market area, stability of demand, and comparatively safe
and secure yields from operations.
In those cases where a statute or regulatory order prescribed the
rates for an entire group no effort was made to measure the overall
effect of the rates on a group of companies. In the Minnesota Rate
Cases,14 rates applicable to a group of railroads were enjoined as to
one railroad, but sustained as to two others. The tests of confiscation
or reasonableness were fashioned to measure the impact of the regula-
138. 262 U.S. at 692-93. The opinion continued: "The return should be reasonably
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility, and should be-
adequate, under efficient and economic management, to maintain and support its-
credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its.
public duties. A rate of return may be reasonable at one time and become too high
or too low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market and
business conditions generally." Id. at 693.
139. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 544 (1898).
140. Id. at 547.
141. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287 (1933);
cf. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1919).
142. 230 U.S. 352 (1913). See also Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States
263 U.S. 456, 481-82 (1924), and cases cited therein at 482.
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tion on individual enterprises. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde,13 a case
involving state-wide insurance rates, articulated the rule which is
illustrated by the holdings in utility and railroad cases: that while
"rates sufficient to yield adequate returns to some may be confiscatory
when applied to the business of others," nevertheless, "the latter have
no constitutional right to prevent their enforcement against the
former."
There are instances in which the Court has approved or required
injunctions against rate orders because of defects in the method or
procedure employed, but those cases may be distinguishable on the
ground that the error was so fundamental that the Court believed
the result was necessarily unjust.144 In the two West Ohio Gas Co.4'
cases of 1935, Justice Cardozo wrote opinions condemning the rate
orders because of the wholesale arbitrary disallowance of operating
expenses and because of the willful refusal to consider operating
experience acquired after the close of the test year. At the same time,
he acknowledged the validity of a general rule which would leave
procedure and method to the administrative discretion. 146 There were
even cases in which the probable result of operations under a new
set of rates was uncertain, and the Court would refuse an injunction
in order to allow a fair test of the rates in their practical operation,
without prejudice to the complainants' right to make another applica-
tion for relief if the rates should prove inadequate.147 One of the last
cases of the federal "fair-value" era emphasized that the question for
the Court "is not as to the mere correctness of the method and reason-
ing adopted but whether the rates it fixes will result in confiscation."
148
In Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,14 9 the Court found that
because of the protracted litigation involved, there had been a sub-
stantial period of operations after the issuance of the Commission's
143. 275 U.S. 440 (1928). The Commission in Permian cites this case to the
proposition that an individual has no constitutional right to the full recovery of costs
under rates fixed in a group proceeding. 34 F.P.C. 159, 180 (1965). Because of the
posture of the case before the Supreme Court, its support for that proposition is
dubious, although its language admittedly tends to support the Commision's use of It.
144. McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419 (1938); West v. Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935); Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S.
133 (1930); St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461 (1929); Northern
Pacific By. v. Department of Pub. Works, 268 U.S. 39 (1925).
145. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63 (1935); West Ohio
Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79 (1935).
146. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 70 (1935).
147. New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 340 (1947); Clark's Ferry Bridge
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 291 U.S. 227 (1934); Brush Elec. Co. v. City of Gal-
veston, 262 U.S. 443 (1923); Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564 (1917); Willcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909); and Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co.,
212 U.S. 1 (1909).
149. Railroad Comm'n v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938).
149. 292 U.S. 151 (1934).
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order. The prosperity enjoyed by the company during that period was
so inconsistent with the apparently low rate of return on the fair
value rate base that the Court discarded its usual standard and refused
an injunction, declaring that "elaborate calculations which are at war
with realities are of no avail."150 By that holding, the Court showed a
remarkable inclination to subordinate theoretical consistency to eco-
nomic practicality.
V. HoPE NATURAL GAS AND ITs CONTEMPORARIES
During the later years of the "fair value" era, growing ferment
developed among regulators, scholars and judges, who were becoming
impatient with the conjectural nature of some of the fair value esti-
mates, the speculative increments of "going concern value'" and the
burdensome length and complications of a fair value trial.'5' In a
notable concurring opinion, justices Brandeis and Holmes Vainly
attempted to direct the Court's attention toward concepts of invested
capital rather than property values:
The compensation which the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to earn
is the reasonable cost of conducting the business. Cost includes, not only
operating expenses, but also capital charges. Capital charges cover the
allowance, by way of interest, for the use of the capital, whatever the nature
of the security issued therefor, the allowance for risk incurred, and enough
more to attract capital. The reasonable rate to be prescribed by a com-
mission may allow an efficiently managed utility much more. But a rate is
constitutionally compensatory, if it allows to the utility the opportunity to
earn the cost of the service as thus defined.
152
The rate base, they thought, should be the amount of money prudently
invested in plant and facilities. 5 3 The opinion is replete with tren-
150. Id. at 164.
151. Dobie, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Virginia, 8 VA. L. REv. 477,
504 (1922); Edgerton, Value of the Service as a Factor in Rate-Making, 32 HAzv. L.
Rxv. 516 (1919); Gooddard, Public Utility Valuation, 15 MIcH. L. REv. 205 (1917);
Hale, The 'Physical Value' Fallacy in Rate Cases, 30 YALE L. J. 710 (1921); Henderson,
Railway Valuation and the Courts, 33 HAnv. L. REv. 902 (1920); Richberg, A
Permanent Basis for Rate Regulation, 31 YALE L. J. 263 (1922); Whitten, Fair Value
for Rate Purposes, 27 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1914).
152. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 292 U.S.
276, 291 (1923).
153. Id. at 289 n.1. "Prudent investment," as Mr. Justice Brandeis used it, meant
the amount honestly and prudently spent on plant and property, less the reserve for
depreciation. Such a rate base elminates some of the disadvantages of fair value, as
expounded in the opinion, but it has its own disadvantages, especially in an extended
period of progressive inflation. It not only ignores the unreality of recorded costs when
the value of the dollar is declining, but it also creates the risk that a "disappearing"
rate base, as the amount of depreciation reserve approaches the book cost of the
property, will deprive the investor of any opportunity to earn revenues related to
property actually in service. Modern techniques of trended cost and price level ad-
justments have eliminated, furthermore, much of the administrative delay and in-
convenience attendant upon the fair value determinations of the former era. The
practical objections to fair value have little validity under modem conditions.
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chant criticism of the fair value practice of that day and its practical
consequences.
By 1942, the Court was apparently ready to move a step away
from strict application of the whole fair value theory. In an investiga-
tion of the rates of Natural Gas Pipeline Company, the FPC dis-
allowed 8,500,000 dollars of "going concern value" claimed by the
company, although otherwise it accepted the estimates of value pro-
vided by company witnesses; it calculated depreciation expense on an
actual cost base, rather than on present value or reproduction cost;
and it ordered a reduction of the company's rates. The Supreme
Court sustained the order in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.15 Chief
Justice Stone's majority opinion overruled none of the fair value
decisions; instead, it borrowed and enlarged earlier doctrine which
had been developing as a limitation upon judicial review:
The Constitution does not bind rate making bodies to the service of any
single formula or combination of formulas. Agencies to whom the legislative
power has been delegated are free, within the ambit of their statutory au-
thority to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by par-
ticular circumstances. Once a fair hearing has been given, proper findings
made and other statutory requirements satisfied, the courts cannot intervene
in the absence of a clear showing that the limits of due process have been
overstepped. If the Commission's order, as applied to the facts before it
and viewed in its entirety, produces no arbitrary result, our inquiry is at an
end.155
On the facts, the decision held no more than that the specific
objections to the Commission's findings were not sufficiently serious
to justify a reversal. justices Black, Douglas and Murphy concurred
in the result, but protested the rationale of the decision. 156 They
thought the occasion was appropriate "to lay to rest the ghost of
Smyth v. Ames" 157 by establishing prudent investment or actual cost
as the minimum constitutional level of the rate base. Furthermore,
they advanced the proposition that even a rate barely sufficient to
enable the company to earn the actual cost of rendering service
might be unjust and unreasonable to the public, therefore causing a
"'collision" between investor and consumer interests. It followed, in
their opinion, that the majority had not conceded the full appropriate
breadth of administrative discretion:
The possibility of that collision reinforces the view that the problem of rate-
making is for the administrative experts not the courts and that the ex
post facto function previously performed by the courts should be reduced
154. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
,155. Id. at 586.
156. Id. at 599.
157. 169 U.S. 466 (1898); cf. Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?
55 HArv. L. REv. 1116 (1942).
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to the barest minimum which is consistent with the statutory mandate for
judicial review .... 158
In its subsequent investigation of the rates of Hope Natural Gas
Company, the Commission rejected the company's fair value evidence
and based the rates on "actual, legitimate cost." 59 Moreover, it
eliminated more than seventeen million dollars of well drilling costs,
which the company had charged off on its books as operating expenses
in earlier years, but now sought to restore to its property accounts.
It ordered Hope to reduce its rates. A sharply divided Supreme
Court sustained the Commission's order in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
Co.16
0
Since it recognized that rate regulation involves a "balancing of
consumer and investor interests," Justice Douglas' majority opinion
set out to define the legitimate concern of the investor interest:
From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be
enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs
of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the
stock. . . . By that standard, the return to the equity owner should be
commensurate with the returns on other investments having corresponding
risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in
the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to
attract capital.
161
Applying this standard, Justice Douglas concluded that the financial
history of the company, its notable success and prosperity, and the
amounts available for the benefit of its common stockholders under
the new rates were adequate to show that the rates were reasonable.
Therefore, he said the Court need not consider "the conditions under
which more or less might be allowed" than his standard seemed to
require. Furthermore, it was not important to the decision,
to determine the various permissible ways in which any rate base on which
the return is computed might be arrived at. For we are of the view that
the end result in this case cannot be condemned under the Act as unjust
and unreasonable from the investor or company viewpoint.
162
Both Natural Gas Pipeline'63 and Hope'6 rejected the notion that
review by separate constitutional standards is appropriate in a case
involving the Natural Gas Act. "Since there are no constitutional
158. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 608 (1942).
159. Hope Natural Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 150 (1942).
160. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). For additional background matter, see Gatchell, Some
Basic Factors and Trends in Public Utility Regulation, 12th Om & GAs INST. 23,
41-47 (Sw. Legal Fdn. 1961).
161. 320 U.S. at 603.
162. Id.
163. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942).
164. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 607 (1944).
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requirements more exacting than the standards of the Act," Justice
Douglas said, "a rate order which conforms to the latter does not
run afoul of the former."165 Where prior decisions had been willing
to concede legislative discretion as to method, testing the result by
the Court's findings of fair value and fair rate of return, the Court
would now accept more generalized financial criteria in lieu of
theoretically correct rate base or rate of return findings. Emphasis
lay on the result of the order, however determined:
[Ilt is the result reached not the method employed which is control-
ling .... It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts.
If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and un-
reasonable, judicial inquiry under the act is at an end. The fact that the
method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not im-
portant.
166
Therefore, it is worth observing that the Hope and Natural Gas
Pipeline cases did not adopt the Brandeis theory of prudent invest-
ment as a standard of either constitutional or statutory review;
neither did they condemn the fair value theory as a standard for
administrative guidance.167 The rationale of the cases has as little
concern for prudent investment methodology as it has for fair value
methodology. Dissenting opinions by Justices Frankfurter and Reed
in the Hope case fortify that conclusion: the former disapproved the
majority opinion because he felt it abandoned objective criteria of
review; 16 the latter professed to find consistency between the major-
ity's approach and the fair value rule and dissented only because the
Commission had eliminated the seventeen million dollars worth of
well drilling costs from the rate base. 169
The approach of the Hope case is peculiarly limited to consideration
of the impact of a rate order upon an individual utility. Defending
his standard in a later opinion, Justice Douglas denied that it was
"so vague and devoid of meaning as to render judicial review a
perfunctory process;" it was, he insisted, "a standard of finance resting
on stubborn facts." 170 If so, it was individual company finance, since
the heart of his analysis was a review of the Hope company's history
and prospects. Furthermore, the Court supported the Commission's
165. Id.
166. Id. at 602.
167. Id. at 628, 629 (Jackson, J., dissenting opinion).
168. Id. at 627: "It will little advance the public interest to substitute for the
hodge-podge of the rule in Smyth v. Ames . . . an encouragement of conscious ob-
scurity or confusion in reaching a result, on the assumption that so long as the result
appears harmless its basis is irrelevant."
169. Id. at 620, 624.
170. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 605 (1945); cf. Colorado-
Wyoming Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 626 (1945).
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order by financial analysis of overall company operations but refused
to consider the impact on separate functional divisions.
It was this last aspect that impelled Justice Jackson to dissent, in
a brilliant and eloquent opinion which may have more influence in
producer regulation than any majority opinion in any decided case.' 7 '
Instead of devising a field price approach to the expense of company-
produced gas, the Commission had simply lumped the cost of pro-
ducing properties along with other assets in the rate base. This
approach profoundly disturbed Justice Jackson. He suspected that
previous decisions of the Court might have "constrained the Commis-
sion to accept the rate base method for producing properties," and
he would have reversed the case so as to make it clear that the
Commission is free to regulate the producing segment of the business
on a basis more compatible with economic reality.172 The heart of
the problem, as he saw it, is "the elusive, exhaustible and irre-
placeable nature of natural gas itself." Facilities relating to other
kinds of utility business can be replaced, given sufficient time and
money, but "the wealth of Midas and the wit of man cannot produce
or reproduce a natural gas field."73
Hence, he advocated advising the Commission that it is "free to
face up realistically to the nature and peculiarity of the resources in
its control, to foster their duration in fixing price, and to consider
future interests in addition to those of investors and present con-
sumers." He thought that the Commission should "boldly make sound
economic considerations, instead of legal and accounting theories, the
foundation of federal policy." 74 Considering, among other things,
that the yields from production are not proportionate to the amount
invested,'7 5 that the prudent investment method would result in
absurdly varying field prices,17 6 and that a fair overall price is essential
to induce producers to drill,77 he would have allowed the Commission
"to fix the price of gas in the field as one would fix maximum prices
of oil or milk or coal, or any other commodity." Rate base and rate
of return would not be relevant:
The emphasis would shift from the producer to the product, which would
be regulated with an eye to average or typical producing conditions in the
field.' 78
The purport of the dialogue between Justice Jackson and the major-
171. 320 U.S. 591, 628 (1944).
172. Id. at 660.
173. Id. at 629.
174. Id. at 660.
175. Id. at 649.
176. Id. at 649.
177. Id. at 654, 655.
178. Id. at 652.
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ity is clouded by two factors: West Virginia was in the case contend-
ing for higher field prices so as to maintain its production tax revenues
at a desirable level; and the Jackson opinion also contended for a
rate design which would increase the share of costs borne by in-
dustrial customers in order to discourage industrial consumption and
conserve more gas for domestic use. While the majority opinion re-
jected "novel" doctrines, and expressed the view that sections 4(a)
and 5(a) of the Act "contain only the conventional standards of rate-
making,"79 these comments apparently were directed at the extraneous
policy concepts implicit in the production tax and industrial revenue
arguments rather than Jackson's contention that sensible field price
regulation requires repudiation of the rate base approach. Probably,
Justice Jackson's proposal was rejected because of the majority's
preoccupation with the overall relaxation of judicial review, rather
than because of any fundamental disagreement with his economic
and legal arguments.
When Colorado Interstate Gas Company, in the next case to reach
the Court on the issue,180 contended that its company-produced gas
should be priced at a "fair field price" based on the average contract
prices paid to other producers in the field, the Court was more circum-
spect in its handling of the argument:
We do not say that the Commission lacks the authority to depart from the
rate base method. We only hold that the Commission is not precluded from
using it....
[T]he Act does not say that the Commission would have to value [com-
pany-produced gas] at the fair field price if the Commission abandoned the
rate-base method of regulation.
181
Apparently satisfied with these concessions, Justice Jackson concurred
in the result, but his concurring opinion re-emphasized the inescapable
absurdities of the rate base approach to gas production.182 Paradoxi-
cally, he could have carried the day for his views at this point, for
the Chief Justice and three colleagues dissented'8 3 on the ground that
including producing properties in the rate base violated the producing
and gathering exemption in the Act. If he had concurred with them
instead of with Justice Douglas, the case would have gone back to the
Commission on a holding directly contrary to the position which the
District of Columbia Circuit took, only ten years later, in the City
of Detroit'8 case. Intriguing speculations are possible in the con-
templation of what might have happened to the decision of Phillips
179. Id. at 616, 617.
180. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
181. Id. at 601, 603.
182. Id. at 608.
183. Id. at 615.
184. City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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I1 (or, if jurisdiction over natural gas producers had been estab-
lished anyway, what changes might have been wrought in the
course of producer regulation) had Justice Jackson adhered to his
principles in his vote as well as in his exposition of them.
In the same year, Justice Jackson, on behalf of a unified Court,
interpreted the principles of the Hope case as they applied to the
unique factual situation of Market Street Railway v. Railroad Corn-
mission.186 The state commission had ordered a reduction in trolley
rates, but the company had been permitted to collect its higher rates
pending the proceedings, subject to impounding and potential refund.
In the meantime, the company, nearing failure, had sold its facilities.
The issue was whether the refund could be enforced. The opinion
reiterated what Chief Justice Stone and Justice Douglas had already
said, that regulation could not guarantee net profits. "All that was
held [in Hope]," said Jackson, "was that a company could not com-
plain if the return which was allowed made it possible for the
company to operate successfully." He refused to infer the converse.
The end result test is "inapplicable to a company whose financial
integrity already is hopelessly undermined, which could not attract
capital on any possible rate, and where investors recognize as lost
a part of what they have put in." While Hope had carefully defined
the investor's legitimate interest in net returns, "there was no sug-
gestion that less might not be allowed when the amount allowed was
all that the company could earn."181 Although the company attacked
the commission's implication that the company's fares exceeded the
value of the service, and its prediction that lower fares might increase
rather than decrease revenue, the Court found no impropriety in the
commission's comparison of services rendered under the lower rate
with that rendered under the new rate. Furthermore, "it is not for-
bidden by the Constitution that there be a pragmatic test of matters
which even the most expert could not know in advance." 88
Decisions from the utility sphere, including those which treated
railroads like utilities, do not yield overwhelming support for the
proposition that a rate order must allow every individual subject
thereto the recovery of his costs. Cost was a subordinate principle
in the era of constitutional "fair value." All that Brandeis and Holmes
as lonely juristic advocates ever espoused was that the order should
allow an opportunity to recover the cost of service. 89 In the era
185. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
186. 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
187. Id. at 566.
188. Id. at 569.




where sustained inflation carried present values above cost, Hope held
no more than to sustain rates which clearly permitted profitable
operations. Indeed, by their disdain for fair value arguments, both
Hope and Natural Gas Pipeline Co. drained the vitality out of the
federal constitutional doctrine of confiscation. Furthermore, Market
Street Railway recognized the definite economic limitation upon the
power of rates to provide profitable operations.1'0
VI. O=ini DEPARTURES: GROUP PROCEDURES AND
REPRESENTATVE COSTS
Procedures and standards evolved in railroad regulation by the
Interstate Commerce Commission are both interesting and instruc-
tive, although a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this
article. The original monopolistic advantage of the railroads has
evaporated, as they have become increasingly vulnerable to com-
petition by motor, air and water carriers. However, even before the
influence of competition diminished the carriers' insistence on the
recovery of all costs of service through rates, the Commission had
devised special techniques to cope with the practical administrative
problems created by the numerous and diverse companies within its
jurisdiction.
Justice Brandeis' lucid and comprehensive opinion in the New
England Divisions Case'91 described and approved the development
of specialized procedures. Regulation of groups of railroads in a
single proceeding had been specifically authorized in the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920;192 however, the Act merely ratified a practice of long
standing. "It was the actual necessities of procedure and administra-
tion which had led to the adoption of that method, in passing upon
the reasonableness of proposed rate increases. The necessity of adopt-
ing a similar course when [there were] multitudes of divisions [of
joint rates for transportation involving connecting carriers] was
obvious. The method was equally appropriate in such enquiries; and
190. At least 22 of the states still adhere to some variety of the fair value or repro-
duction cost rule of rate-making because of local statutory or constitutional provisions.
See Rose, Confusion in Valuation for Public Utility Rate-Making, 47 MINN. L. REV.
1, 2 (1963). Professor Priest states persuasive economic, practical and legal bases for
the fair value rule in his article, Major Public Utility Decisions in Perspective, 46 VA.
L. REV. 1327 (1960); cf. Smith, The Reality of the Public Utility Rate Base, 67 DIcm.
L. REv. 83 (1963). Additional interest in fair value type standards is shown by the
recent introduction in Congress of H.R. 12027, which would require the FPC to
consider in its rate base determinations changes in the purchasing power of the
dollar after December 31, 1966, as measured by the Consumer Price Index published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Despite the academic arguments to the contrary,
the health of regulated utilities in the future may well depend on price-level adjust-
ments to the rate base in all jurisdictions.
191. 261 U.S. 184 (1923).
192. 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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we must assume that Congress intended to confer upon the Commis-
sion power to pursue it." 93
As for the handling of costs in such a proceeding, the basic premise
was that the Commission would base its order on evidence "typical
in character, and ample in quantity, to justify the finding made in
respect to each division of each rate of every character."19 Obviously
not every carrier would incur only typical or representative costs in
performing its part of the service. Therefore, the Commission had
provided a saving clause in its order, whereby an individual might
obtain a special exception by showing that the order operated in an
unjust or unduly harsh way in its individual circumstances. No
constitutional question was created by this kind of procedure. Con-
gress could have established a statutory presumption that the group
rates were valid. Although Congress had not done this, the effect
was the same, since "only in that way could the task be per-
formed . .. "195 There could be no legitimate objection to this type
of hearing procedure:
A hearing may be a full one, although the evidence introduced does not
enable the tribunal to dispose of the issues completely or permanently and
although the tribunal is convinced, when entering the order thereon, that,
upon further investigation, some changes in it will have to be made.
196
Significant emphasis upon the New England Divisions Case came
recently in the case of Chicago & Northwestern Railway v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway.197 Since the petitions for certiorari
relative to Skelly were pending at the time of the decision, the
opinion takes on special significance. 98 The case involved rate divi-
sions, and the Commission proceeded in its customary way. The
district court reversed the Commission, holding that it was obliged
to determine, in precise dollar amount, the revenue needs of each
individual railroad, and also the revenue effect on each railroad of
the new divisions established in its order. No appellee even defended
the position of the district court when the case went up.199 However,
because it thought "the error in that position, which rejects over 40
years of administrative practice, requires comment," the Court fully
expounded the basis for group regulation in its opinion.200 The Com-
mission had long since found "the complexity of the subject matter
193. 261 U.S. 184, 198-99 (1923) (the text is also supported by cases cited at 197).
194. Id. at 197.
195. Id. at 199.
196. Id. at 201.
197. 387 U.S. 326 (1967).
198. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion on May 29, 1967. Certiorari was
granted in the Skelly case on June 12, 1967. 388 U.S. 906 (1967).
199. 387 U.S. 326, 340 (1967).
200. Id. at 341.
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and the multiplicity of carriers typically involved in divisions cases
were such that a wooden requirement of individual findings would
make effective regulation all but impossible." The Court saw that the
considerations underlying the New England Divisions Case were
amply illustrated by the case now before it:
The pragmatic justifications for the Commission's group procedures are
obvious. Even on a group basis, the Commission proceedings in this case
require a voluminous record and were not completed until nearly 10 years
after the complaints were filed. To demand individual evidence and find-
ings for each of the 300 carriers in the Commission proceedings would so
inflate the record and prolong administrative adjudication that the Com-
mission's regulatory authority would be paralyzed.
Nor do considerations of fairness require disregard of administrative neces-
sities. The premise of group proceedings, as the New England Divisions
Case explicitly recognized, is that evidence pertaining to a group is typical
of its individual members .... It has always been accepted that an indi-
vidual carrier may challenge this premise, and, on proper showing, receive
independent consideration if its individual situation is so atypical that its
inclusion in group consideration would be inappropriate. It is the Com-
mission's practice to accord independent treatment to an individual carrier
when a proper request for special consideration is made. . . . Departure
from the practicalities of group procedure is justified only when there is
a real need for separate treatment of a given carrier; the individual carriers
themselves, which have the closest understanding of their own situation
and interests, are normally the appropriate parties to show that such need
exists.
201
One slight shift of emphasis in the Court's discussion of the saving
clause may have significance. Where Justice Brandeis had predicated
special relief on harshness towards the individual carrier,2 2 this most
recent opinion attaches the greater importance to whether the carrier's
"ability to provide service is jeopardized."20 3 Furthermore, a footnote
in the opinion quotes the Commission's own description of saving
clause procedures, which it says enable it to "provide special individ-
ual treatment in order to maintain [the atypical] carrier as part of
the nation's transportation system without regard to its cost of
rendering the service."204 The Court may be indicating that the
applicable standard for individual exceptions is preservation of the
ability of the carrier to render service rather than its ability to earn
a fair return. If so, the portent of the decision for high-cost gas
producers could be ominous.
Other cases have pointed up the requirement of typical or repre-
sentative evidence. United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway
0 5
201. Id. at 342-43.
202. 261 U.S. 184, 199 (1923).
203. 387 U.S. 326, 366 (1967).
204. Id. at 366 n.38.
205. 265 U.S. 274 (1924).
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reversed the Commission partly because it had altered existing divi-
sions on findings of mere aggregates of revenue and cost. Justice
Brandeis stressed the principle that
Evidence of individual rates or divisions, said to be typical of all, affords a
basis for a finding as to any one. But averages are apt to be misleading.
206
Although Beaumont, San Lake & Western Railway v. United States
207
criticized the Commission's report for failure to find clearly that the
evidence justified reliance on average costs, the Court searched the
record and concluded that "as to each carrier, operating and other
conditions were shown and presumably considered by the Commis-
sion in deciding whether average or group conditions might appropri-
ately be used."
A distinction in the handling of costs has been made between cases
involving all of the rates of an individual or group and cases involving
only individual rates. In ICC v. Union Pacific Railroad208 the Court
said:
Where the rates as a whole are under consideration, there is a possibility
of deciding, with more or less certainty, whether the total earnings afford
a reasonable return. But whether the carrier earned dividends or not sheds
little light on the question as to whether the rate on a particular article is
reasonable. For, if the carrier's total income enables it to declare a dividend,
that would not justify an order requiring it to have one class of goods for
nothing, or for less than a reasonable rate. On the other hand, if the
carrier earned no dividend, it would not have warranted an order fixing an
unreasonably high rate on such article.
The principle explains the Court's statement in another case, that
"[t]here is nothing in the [Interstate Commerce Act] requiring the
use of the net return as evidence to fix a particular rate."209
Decisions by the Commission itself introduce the necessity for
considering the following when individual rates are being set: the
value of the commodity;210 the value of the service, as well as its
cost;21' the volume of business and the conditions and force of com-
petition;212 and the ability of the shipper to reach a market and make
206. Id. at 290.
207. 282 U.S. 74 (1930).
208. 222 U.S. 541, 549 (1912).
209. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 483 (1924).
210. General Commodity Rate Increases, 223 I.C.C. 657, 737-38 (1937); Mountain-
Pacific Oil Cases, 192 I.C.C. 599, 636-37 (1933); Pacific Coast Fourth Section Ap-
plications, 190 I.C.C. 273, 281 (1932); Bice v. Louisville & N. R.R., 1 I.C.C. 722,
739 (1888).
211. Westbound Rates on Meats, 210 I.C.C. 13 (1935); Sand, Gravel, Slag, Stone
and Chert, 165 I.C.C. 731, 766 (1930); Board of R.R. Comm'rs v. Atchinson, T. &
S.F. Ry., 151 I.C.C. 431, 446 (1929); Frohman Chem. Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R.,
115 I.C.C. 322, 323 (1927); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry.,
1 I.C.C. 754, 760-61 (1888).
212. Rubber Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Akron & B.B. Ry., 174 I.C.C. 79, 85, 86
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his commodity a subject of commerce.213 However, "most rates have
within them an element of cost," and "[d]iscretion and flexibility of
judgment within reasonable limits," must govern the weight accorded
that element.214 To make rates based "solely on the fully distributed
costs would ignore value-of-service considerations. If rates were
made in this manner, it would result in reducing the rates on much of
the high-grade traffic transported ...[and increasing] the rates on
most of the low-grade, volume-moving traffic. Rates on the latter have
been made in the past under a continuous interplay of economic
forces to permit such traffic to move with reasonable freedom and
thus to contribute as much as possible to the carriers' overhead or
fixed costs."215
Thus, the Supreme Court's statement that "[b]oth the Commission
and this Court have consistently rejected any thought that costs
should be the controlling factor in rate-making,"216 is justified as a
generalization pertaining to the establishment or alteration of rate
relationships. So many factors come into play in the field as to
prompt the Court's description of the process of rate-making as
essentially empiric:
The stuff of the process is fluid and changing-the resultant of factors that
must be valued as well as weighed. Congress has therefore delegated the
enforcement of transportation policy to a permanent expert body and has
charged it with the duty of being responsive to the dynamic character of
transportation problems.
217
When the Commission undertook to eliminate freight rate dis-
criminations between the South and other sections, it concentrated
on "out-of-pocket costs" as distinguished from depreciation, return
and other fixed costs, to establish "a floor for all rates."2 18 Its sectional
rate reduction was sustained in New York v. United States.210 The
Court noted that operating results under the new rates were not yet
ascertainable, since there had been an increase in the level of all
rates in another proceeding. Since the entire problem was "in flux,"
(1931); Union Tanning Co. v. Southern Ry., 26 I.C.C. 159, 164 (1913); Penick &
Ford v. Director General, 80 I.C.C. 152, 156 (1923); Boston Chamber of Commerce
v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 1 I.C.C. 754, 760-61 (1888).
213. Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 2 I.C.C. 436 (1889).
214. See Boileau v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 22 I.C.C. 640, 652 (1912); cf. Class
Rate Investigation, 262 I.C.C. 447, 692-93 (1945).
215. See United States Sugar Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 277 I.C.C. 193
(1950).
216. See Alabama-Great Southern R.R. v. United States, 340 U.S. 216, 223 n.4
(1951).
217. See Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 546 (1942).
218. Class Rate Investigation, 262 I.C.C. 447, 692-93 (1945).
219. 331 U.S. 284 (1947).
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involving "an interim order made necessary as a result of a compre-
hensive revision of entire rate structures," it held that the district
court had properly protected the carriers "[w]hen it overruled their
claim that the interim rates are confiscatory without prejudice to
another suit to challenge the legality of those rates if, after a fair
test, they prove to be below the lowest reaches of a reasonable
minimum or if the permanent rates do not meet that standard."2
0
In connection with regulation of other types of businesses, fair value
or other rate base problems have not caused serious problems for the
Court. One example is in the regulation of livestock marketing
agencies by the Secretary of Agriculture.' 1 In Acker v. United
States222 the Court approved an order which fixed maximum fees in
accordance with the Secretary's findings of reasonable expenses. The
opinion noted that the agencies owned little fixed property, hence no
substantial question of confiscation could be involved. Another
example is the regulation of insurance rates, as in Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Hyde.
22
In air carrier cases, the CAB has employed an aggregate invested
capital rate base for the entire regulated group, meanwhile recogniz-
ing that its method would result in unsatisfactory returns for individ-
ual members of the groupYm Maritime carrier rates have been fixed
by analyzing the cost of service of a "dominant carrier," and the
resulting rates are imposed upon the entire group under regulation.
2 1
In motor carrier cases, the ICC uses a group operating ratio or profit
margin approach, which hardly resembles conventional utility
methodology., 26 A former commissioner has explained the inapplica-
bility of individual rate base treatment in such cases:
It is demonstrated by experience that a 'fair return on value' of motor
carrier property, or other keenly competitive industries involving a relatively
small fixed plant, but with high operational costs, is inadequate to enable
them to provide adequate and efficient . . . transportation service ...
220. Id. at 340.
221. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231. (1964).
222. 298 U.S. 426 (1936); cf. Tagg Bros. & Morehead v. United States, 280 U.S.
420 (1930).
223. 275 U.S. 440 (1928).
224. See General Passenger Fare Investigation, 32 C.A.B. 291 (1960). Partially
justifying its order, the Board called attention to the possibly beneficial effect of its
fare design, and to the availability of subsidies to the weaker carriers.
225. See Rates of Aleutian Marine Transp. Co., 7 F.M.C. 592 (1963) (prudent
investment); General Increase in Alaskan Rates and Charges, 5 F.M.C. 486 (1958)
(fair value); Hawaii General Increase in Rates, 5 F.M.C. 347 (1957) (fair value).
226. See, e.g., Increases, California, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Texas, 51
M.C.C. 747, 760 (1950). Of some interest, also, is the "bellwether" regulation of
telegraphic common carriers by the FCC. See The Western Union Telegraph Co.,
25 F.C.C. 535, 577-80 (1958); Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 5 F.C.C. 524, 527 (1938).
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[In a highly competitive situation, the fair-return theory is an exercise in
metaphysics.
227
Of course, the same reasoning applies with equal force to a fair
return on cost method in the same circumstances.
These cases, therefore, allow the determination of rates based on
either an average cost level, or a level of costs fixed by judgment
between the highest and lowest costs incurred by individuals within
the group and deemed to be representative. Acker v. United States
sternly rejected the protests of the higher cost livestock market
agencies:
[R]egulation cannot be frustrated by a requirement that the rate be made
to compensate extravagant or unnecessary costs.
228
But the measure of extravagance was the representative level of
costs determined by the Secretary: if costs exceeded those allowed
in the Secretary's rates, they were ipso facto excessive.
No case involving group regulation seems to turn on whether the
aggregate revenue permitted by the order equaled the aggregate
costs of the group.229 At least one case seems to deny consideration
to the argument that the rates are confiscatory on an overall basis, i.e.,
that some portion of the property owned by the group is being con-
fiscated by rates which do not permit an overall fair rate of return
on a group rate base.230 There is even precedent for summary disposi-
tion of the confiscation question where it is administratively infeasible
to consider it, particularly if an individual may escape the conse-
quences of the order by changing the use of his property.
231
227. Aitchison, Fair-Return-on-Value Theory in Rate Making Loses Force, 25 ICC
PnAc. J. 11, 17 (1957).
228. 298 U.S. 426, 431 (1936).
229. Although Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440 (1928), described a method
which apparently equated group revenues and group costs, the decision did not rest
on that factor, but on the necessity of showing individual confiscation. But cf. Sun-
shine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); see United States v. Rack
Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533 (1939); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). How-
ever, there is usually an effort to determine the overall import of the order on that
segment of the group whose operations form the basis of the rate. See notes 224-26
supra.
230. See Beaumont, S.L. & W. Ry. v. United States, 282 U.S. 74 (1930). "There
is no allegation in the complaint, or evidence in the record to show, that any division
to any of the appellants will not yield operating expenses chargeable to the service
covered by it plus a reasonable return on property value fairly attributable to that
service." Id. at 89; cf. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349 (1936)
(ICC would not be reversed merely because it refused to hear evidence on issue of
confiscation).
231. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1943). The case may be distinguishable
because it is based on the war powers of Congress and involves temporary or emergency
legislation. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921).
[ VeOL. 21
NATURAL GAS REGULATION
VII. SKELLY ON REVIEW: PoLicy AND LEGALrrY
These pages have demonstrated that the principles and methods of
rate and price regulation have grown to fit the salient characteristics
of each regulated industry. Each of the landmark decisions was as
controversial in its own time as the Skelly case is today. While in-
dividual costs are always a significant factor, at various times they
have yielded to value concepts, to competitive realities, to super-
vening public needs and to expediency. Each so-called regulatory
principle and method requires evaluation in the light of its own
times; most of the authorities deserve to be distinguished rather than
to be applied or followed. Area rate-making is more likely to stand or
fall on the basis of factors intrinsic to the business of finding and
producing natural gas than on the basis of theories applied in other
regulatory fields in the past.
Skelly arrives before the Supreme Court in a factual setting which
appears greatly to favor ultimate approval of the Commission's order.
At last the Commission has formulated a pricing method which
promises to achieve regulatory control, even though some of its details
may be subject to criticism, and although the Tenth Circuit has
argued plausibly that the underlying findings are deficient. Since
1954, the courts, the industry and the Commission have chafed at
the "nigh interminable"2 2 delay involved. There are strong practical
reasons why the Court might strive to avoid compounding the delays
already encountered. The Court is undoubtedly aware of the other
area proceedings now in progress, 33 the multitude of individual-
exception cases that will surely confront the Commission, the luxuriat-
ing jungle of certificate applications,2 4 and the overriding need to
replace anxieties with certainty. Strong policy considerations, there-
fore, combine to encourage a decision on grounds that will contribute
to stability and strengthen the Commission's hand.m
At least two factual premises underlying area regulation seem to
have been irrefutably established. The first is, of course, the utter
impracticality of attempting to regulate multitudes of producer rates
by individual rate base/rate of return criteria. If the twelve-year
232. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comr'n, 360 U.S. 378, 389 (1959).
233. See note 18 supra. Presiding Examiner Zwerdling issued his initial decision
in the Southern Louisiana Area Rate Proceeding on Dec. 30, 1966. 32 Fed. Reg. 426
(1967). There is no indication that the Commission will issue an order at any time
prior to final disposition of Skelly.
234. The importance of the area rates in certificate cases is noted in Area Rate
Proceeding (Permian Basin), 34 F.P.C. 159, 226, 230-31, 237, 419, 424 (1965); 34
F.P.C. 1068, 1082 (1965), and illustrated by Phillips Petroleum Company v. FPC,
377 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1967) (certificate conditioned on initial price not exceeding
Permian Area ceiling price: held, reversed because of reversal of Permian order).
235. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
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ordeal of the Commission has not established that premise, it is
difficult to see how it could be established in any regulatory field.
One can hardly predict with any assurance that the Court will with-
draw the tentative acceptance of that conclusion by the majority
which decided Phillips 1.236 Second, it is hardly debatable that
utility-type regulation simply does not fit producer economics.
231
Judicial language such as Justice Butler's famous Bluefield Water
Works238 standard, Justice Brandeis' articulation of the investor's
expectation in the Southwestern BellO2 9 case, and Justice Douglas'
analysis of legitimate investor concern in the Hope240 case, is attuned
to security of capital, safety of yield and waiver of speculative gain.
Producers, in contrast, take gamblers' risks in the hope of winning
gamblers' stakes. Regulation cannot furnish guaranties against their
natural risks; nor should it frustrate their legitimate aspirations.
Since many exploratory costs, as well as dry holes, are generally
written off as expenses on the producers' books, their investment
assets on the balance sheet are low, compared to utilities and rail-
roads. Uniform area prices appear to be more consistent with these
characteristics than tailor-made individual rates, designed to recover
all of the individual's costs but straitening the permissible yield within
a narrow, modest limit.
Once the nature of the proceeding is determined, however, there
still remain the critical questions of administrative standards and
judicial review. Apparently four possible approaches to the formula-
tion of rates were before the Commission: (1) average contract
prices established in free bargaining, (2) the level of prices that
would preserve a desirable reserves-to-production ratio, (3) com-
posite costs and (4) a so-called project method.241
Of these, the Commission rejected the first two out of hand.A24  Its
attitude towards price levels established by bargaining reflects a
236. Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 310 (1963). See generally Francis, Area
Price Regulation of Gas Producer Rates by the Federal Power Commission, 68 DICK.
L. REv. 237 (1964).
237. From FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628 (1944) (Jackson. J.,
dissenting), to Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960), to Wisconsin v. FPC,
303 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961), to Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967),
the realization has grown. See Ross, The Area Rate Proceedings: An Unsettled Experi-
ment in Public Control of Natural Gas Prices, 18 Sw. L.J. 165, 199-207 (1964);
Note, FPC Regulation of Independent Producers of Natural Gas, 75 HAnv, L. REv.
549, 551-53 (1962).
238. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 692-93 (1923).
239. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276, 290-91 (1923).
240. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
241. 34 F.P.C. 159, 180-85, 190-91, 192-93 (1965).
242. Id. at 180-85.
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period of conditioning through judicial condemnation of market-
price standards in section 7 cases.243 Commissioner O'Connor de-
veloped at length, in his separate opinion, the proposition that con-
tract price levels established by bargaining are reasonable in relation
to costs, to the price trends in competitive sources of energy, and to
the trends of other economic indicators.42" Perhaps the Commission
deprived itself of important independent verification of its rates by
failing at least to agree with O'Connor's economic exposition.
Although indicating considerable interest in the "project method,"
the Commission thought it had insufficient evidentiary support.
245
Essentially, this method involves a hypothetical unit cost of finding
and producing gas, which treats exploration costs as capital items
rather than current expenses. It bears some resemblance to the
hypothetical cost estimates typical of fair value studies. Future area
price determinations may well establish its importance. 246
The composite cost standards finally selected by the Commission
are similar to the criteria used by the Secretary of Agriculture in
Acker v. United States.4 7 For new gas-well gas, the standard was
current costs, developed on a national basis; for flowing gas, the
standard was historical costs incurred in the Permian Basin, de-
veloped from the questionnaire data. One advocate of the fair value
test has expressed interest in the Commission's statement that "his-
torical costs do not necessarily reflect current realities."248 Obviously,
the use of two different sets of criteria is basic to the two-price
system.
A two-price system was required, the Commission said, for two
reasons. A price geared to current costs is necessary to encourage
producers to continue drilling and developing the nation's gas supply;
however, the same price applied to old gas-well gas and casinghead
gas would allow the producers to reap a "windfall."2 9 Furthermore,
the new gas price can be adjusted in future proceedings without
disturbing the flowing gas price, thus promoting expediency.210
243. See, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 373 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("Con-
gress created the FPC to protect the consumer from the market place, not simply to
reflect it"); United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1961).
244. 34 F.P.C. 159, 243, 252-63 (1965).
245. Id. at 192-93.
246. Note especially the interest of Commissioner Ross, concurring, Id. at 271-73.
247. 298 U.S. 426 (1936); cf. Tagg Bros. & Morehead v. United States, 280 U.S.
420 (1930).
248. 34 F.P.C. 159, 191 (1965); see Priest, Factors Leading up to Permian Basin
Decision, Put. UTm. FORT., March 2, 1967, at 13, 17; af. Note, FPC Regulation of
Independent Producers of Natural Gas, 75 H~Av. L. REv. 549, 552 (1962) (discusses
use of past years to predict future costs of production).
249. 34 F.P.C. 159, 186-87 (1965).
250. Id. at 227-28.
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However, it seems questionable for the Commission to be so con-
cerned about "windfalls," in view of the basic postulates of the
area method.251 So long as fair current costs are the basis of pricing,
a uniform price for all gas of the same quality is more consistent
with the economics of commodity merchandising.2- 2 The Commission
may not have properly recognized the need for internally generated
funds from past discoveries in order to finance future drilling. Two-
price incentives may well be insufficient to encourage exploration. If
the Commission felt the amounts allowed for exploratory costs and
return would be excessive when applied to oil-well gas, it might have
been fairer to break the prices as between oil-well gas and gas-well
gas.253 Although two-thirds of the gas produced in the Permian Basin
is oil-well gas, there is no indication that the Commission found it
evenly distributed between individual producers.
In the case of contracts providing prices below the area ceilings,
the Commission again departed from a strictly uniform treatment.
No correlation of costs with gas of varying contract price or vintage
appears in the opinion; neither is there apparent evidentiary support
for a 9-cent minimum price, as opposed to 6 or 12 cents or any other
figure.25 While giving the purchaser the benefit of the lower contract
prices between the minimum price and the area ceiling, the Com-
mission also refused to take the resulting loss of revenue into account
as a factor in its price computations, saying
It would be contrary to all regulatory principles to permit prices in excess
of an otherwise just and reasonable rate for certain purchases merely be-
cause other sales had been voluntarily made at below full cost as herein
determined.2z5
That is not a sufficient answer to the producers' objection. The
regulatory principle established in the area proceedings is that
uniform area prices provide a fair opportunity of profit for all pro-
ducers fortunate enough to find marketable quantities of gas. To
251. The Commission acknowledged that "individual returns will vary greatly" and
that "there is scope for greater or lesser reward as dictated by the results of ex-
ploratory efforts." Id. at 179.
252. See Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Forest Oil Corp.
v. FPC, 263 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1959). But cf. Comment, Regulating Independent
Gas Producers: The First Area Attempt, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 84 (1966).
253. The examiner did so. 34 F.P.C. 159, 172, 337, 357-60 (1965).
254. Id. at 231-32.
255. 34 F.P.C. 1068, 1073 (1965). Presumably the "regulatory principles" involved
are those established by FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145 (1962)
(losses in one area do not justify an illegal gain in another), and FPC v. Sierra Pac.
Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956) (utility generally not entitled to be relieved of
improvident bargain by regulation, unless rate so low as to affect public interest).




reduce the producers' higher negotiated prices, while holding them
to their lower negotiated prices and refusing to make up the loss of
revenue, is an unnecessary and inconsistent stricture.
Developing its overall justification that there is a "fair relationship
between the aggregate price the consumer pays and the aggregate
costs that the producers incur,"2 6 the Commission emphasizes, on
application for rehearing, factors tending to offset the harshness of
some of its rulings.257 While quality deductions are treated as a risk
rather than a cost, the Commission finds their maximum impact in
the range of 0.7 cent to 1.5 cents per Mef.z2 8 The ceiling price
computation includes a 4.08 cents allowance for exploration and
development and a 12 per cent return on investment, which the
Commission deemed excessive as applied to gas discovered in the
search for oil and produced from an oil well. Even the utility cases
have permitted offsetting errors to sustain the regulatory order. 59
The possible legality of the action, however, does not excuse the
individual hardships likely to result from the inconsistencies of the
order. These deficiencies are aggravated by the 50 Btu gap in
the Btu adjustment, as Commissioner O'Connor demonstrated in
dissent. 60
Although the 12 per cent return on investment looks high in com-
parison to returns allowed by the Commission in pipeline cases,
there are reasons why it may be barely adequate, if adequate at all.
The computation bears little resemblance to the calculation of utility
return; in effect, it is but a mathematical device employed to fix a
profit margain in constructing the unit price. While two factors are
involved in the computation, the investment factor involves the
clearest demonstration yet that a depreciated cost-type rate base is
a "disappearing" rate base. The Commission took an average twenty-
year life, divided it into investment, and multiplied the dividend by
eleven, comprising one-half of the life plus one year of lag time.26
Perhaps the overall result is fair to the producer, since the earliest
years of production generally are the flush years, and the producer
may obtain his returns more rapidly than at the even rate which the
calculation assumes. On the other hand, it is clear that the Commis-
sion has introduced factors which could reduce the yields to unsatis-
factory levels. It might have reached a better result by focusing on
256. 34 F.P.C. 159, 179 (1965); 34 F.P.C. 1068, 1074 (1965).
257. 34 F.P.C. 1068, 1072-74 (1965).
258. Id. at 1073.
259. Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 292 U.S. 290, 298-304
(1934); Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287, 309-11
(1933); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 55 (1909).
260. 34 F.P.C. 159, 267-68 (1965).
261. Id. at 199-200.
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economic criteria related to the profit margins necessary to generate
the funds and provide incentive for exploratory programs, rather
than the inapposite return standards of its pipeline rate cases.
While acknowledging Justice Brandeis' dictum that "it is easier to
reject formulas presented as being misleading than to find one
apparently adequate,"26 2 one might nevertheless indulge the hope that
the Commission would in future proceedings be more consistent with
the uniform commodity price predicate, and less intent on providing
harsh details which afford minuscule benefits to individual consumers
but serious hazards to individual producers. 3  Small changes in
the well-head price are, as Commissioner O'Connor showed, scarcely
discernible in the price the ultimate consumer pays for gas.214 One
might recall the words of Thomas Babington Macaulay:
The Puritan hated bear-baiting, not because it gave pain to the bear, but
because it gave pleasure to the spectators.
265
VIII. TnE PossiBLE OuTcovmi
Nothing in the authorities really supports Skelly's equation of group
revenues with group costs.2 6 The Hope case did not provide affirma-
tive requirements to which rate orders must conform; that case
devised the "end-result" test only as a means of departure from the
fair value authorities. 6 7 To require overall rate base/rate of return
findings aggregates and therefore enlarges the ponderous impractic-
ability of the individual rate base/rate of return approach.268 What
group is to be employed, those who answered the questionnaires,
269
262. Groesbeck v. Duluth, S.S. & A. Ry., 250 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1919).
263. Judge Breitenstein has commented on the comparative amounts involved and
their comparative importance in Sunray DX Oil Co. v. FP0, 370 F.2d 181 (10th Cir.
1966): "The distributors emphasize the importance of refunds to the protection of
the consumer interests. This may be conceded to the extent that refunds are passed
down to the ultimate user. These benefits must be weighed against the desirability of
the maintenance of an adequate supply of gas. A repricing of the gas, without warn-
ing, cannot help but have a severe impact on the operations of the producers. We
will not speculate on the effect of such repricing on their exploration and develop-
ment activities. The benefits derived from such costly activities may or may not be
of greater value, from the public standpoint, than the few dollars recovered by the
home consumer. Perhaps he would rather have an assured supply for his expensive
appliances than a modest refund." Id. at 192-93.
264. 34 F.P.C. 159, 257-59 (1965).
265. 1 T. MAcAULEY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 154 (1899).
266. 375 F.2d 6, 27, 35 (1967).
267. Cf. Bauer, The Establishment and Administration of a Prudent Investment Rate
Base, 53 YALE L. J. 495 (1944).
268. Note, FPC Regulation of Independent Producers of Natural Gas, 75 Hnv. L.
REv. 549, 562 (1962). The number of independent producers far exceeds the number
of air or maritime carriers involved in a typical CAB or FMB proceeding.
269. 34 F.P.C. 159, 213-14 (1965). If this is the group the court had in mind, its
revenue-cost equation is at least feasible; otherwise, it would be very difflcult to apply.
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all those who are parties to the proceeding,270 or all those who operate
in the area and will be affected by the rate?271
Reasoning in prior cases offers the Supreme Court a number of
avenues to avoid applying the Skelly test. Conceivably, it might hold
such a test inapplicable because aggregated confiscation standards
are inappropriate for determining prices in this industry.272 On the
other hand, it might hold the rate of return and revenue-cost tests
inapplicable because the prices involved are "particular" rates, not
company-wide rates.
273
If the Court feels there has not been an adequate period of opera-
tion under the two-price system to test its built-in incentive features,
it could borrow the "fair trial" device from a number of cases and
hold that the present attack is premature.27 4 Or it may well consider
the questions of reasonableness and confiscation to be premature,
since individual hardships have not yet been adequately developed
in the record.275 An individual producer may well be required to
avail himself of the saving clause procedure before he is permitted
to complain.
2 76
Moreover, the factors suggested by the Commission, particularly
on application for rehearing, could lead the Court to the conclusion
that the overall end result, on the facts of this case, is fair.2 77 Such
a holding would not necessarily portend, however, that an identical
rate design would be approved in other areas where there is not
such a predominance of oil-well gas, where plant revenues are
proportionately less, where higher cost factors are involved, or where
the historical pricing pattern is different. It could be very useful
for the Court to limit its holding to the peculiar facts of this case,
thereby encouraging the Commission to exploit the full range of
adiinistrative flexibility in future proceedings.
270. There were 336 respondents. FPC Press Release No. 13964, Aug. 5, 1965.
271. Approximately 1400 would be affected. Id.
272. Cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
273. Cf. Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924); ICC v.
Union Pacific R.R., 222 U.S. 541 (1912).
274. Cf. New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 340 (1947); Clark's Ferry Bridge
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 291 U.S. 227 (1934); Brush Elec. Co. v. City of Gal-
veston, 262 U.S. 443 (1923); Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564 (1917); Willcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909); Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212
U.S. 1 (1909). The Commission expressly invoked a "practical test" of its two-price
system in 34 F.P.C. 159, 188 (1965).
275. Cf. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 326, 343 (1967);
Beaumont, S.L. & W. Ry. v. United States, 282 U.S. 74, 89 (1930).
276. Cf. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 326 (1967).
The Court said: "If the Commission's new divisions . . . do have an impact on the
Rio Grande [railroad] that is unfairly disproportionate ... the Rio Grande may apply
to the Commission for relief. There is no reason to suppose that relief will not be
promptly forthcoming if the Rio Grande's claim is meritorious." Id. at 366-67.
277. 34 F.P.C. 1068, 1072-73 (1965).
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Finally, while the Supreme Court is likely to provide by its judg-
ment all of the latitude that the Commission needs to perform its
regulatory duty, the wisdom of the Commission's policies will depend
upon the continued availability of adequate gas reserves. Producers
are arguing that the Permian rates are not sufficiently compensatory
to enable them to explore for gas on a satisfactory scale. Debate will
continue until the future course of the industry has been established.
Undoubtedly, the practical effect of regulation will prove more im-
portant than the historical continuity or theoretical validity of the
principles and methods involved.
Area pricing is a pragmatic approach, promising workable solutions
to the problems created by the first Phillips decision. It would be
unfortunate if irrelevant utility precedents, unnecessarily harsh
methods, or an unreasonably stringent attitude should subvert and
destroy the potential benefit of an area approach. If the Commission
continues its efforts to develop adequate and precise factual data
and to devise ingenious, pragmatic techniques for application to the
unique problems it faces, it can make a substantial contribution in
the development of an energy supply to meet the nation's growing
needs. If its policies should cripple the industry or discourage growth,
tomorrow's consumer is unlikely to applaud a transient bargain made
available to his predecessors.
[ VOL,. 21
